Putting innovation incentives back in the patent-antitrust interface by Cheng, TKH
Title Putting innovation incentives back in the patent-antitrustinterface
Author(s) Cheng, TKH
Citation Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property,2013, v. 11 n. 5, p. 385-440
Issued Date 2013
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/183627
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255909
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property
Volume 11 | Issue 5 Article 5
2013
Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the Patent-
Antitrust Interface
Thomas Cheng
University of Hong Kong
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law
Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Cheng, Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the Patent-Antitrust Interface, 11 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 385 (2013).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol11/iss5/5
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255909
 
 
 
Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the  
Patent-Antitrust Interface 
Thomas Cheng 
 
 
April 2013 VOL. 11, NO. 5 
 
© 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
     N O R T H W E S T E R N  
J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  
A N D  
I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
Copyright 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 11, Number 5 (April 2013) 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
 
 
Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the  
Patent-Antitrust Interface 
By Thomas Cheng
*
 
This Article proposes a new approach, the constrained maximization approach, to the 
patent-antitrust interface.  It advocates a return to the utilitarian premise of the patent 
system, which posits that innovation incentives are preserved so long as the costs of 
innovation are recovered.  While this premise is widely accepted, it is seldom applied by 
the courts in patent-antitrust cases.  The result is that courts and commentators have 
been overly deferential to dynamic efficiency arguments in defense of patent exploitation 
practices, and have failed to scrutinize the extent to which patentee reward is genuinely 
essential to generating innovation incentives.  Under the constrained maximization 
approach, the antitrust courts attempt to maximize the net social benefits of an innovation 
by adjusting the scope of patent exploitation, subject to the constraint that innovation 
costs are recouped.  This approach will allow the courts to take into account two 
important considerations in the balance between static and dynamic efficiencies that 
have been largely overlooked: the contribution of cumulative innovation to social welfare 
and the variety of ways in which innovators recover their R&D investments in addition to 
patent protection.  Incorporation of both of these considerations lends support to a more 
robust approach to the patent-antitrust interface. 
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INTRODUCTION 
¶1  The patent-antitrust interface is probably the area of antitrust law that has received 
the most academic attention in recent years.
1
  With its juxtaposition of patent policy with 
antitrust policy, it is generally perceived to be one of the most intricate areas of antitrust. 
In fact, to the best of this author’s knowledge, it is the only area on which a separate 
treatise has been published.
2
  To the extent that patent policy and antitrust policy conflict 
over the assessment of the legality of a patent exploitation practice, the courts must 
balance antitrust concerns about static efficiency and consumer welfare with the dynamic 
efficiency considerations of patent law.  Any area of antitrust that requires balancing is, 
by nature, complicated.  A balancing exercise that requires consideration of the policy of 
another body of law is yet more complex.  
 
1
 For a sample of this vast body of literature, see William Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of 
the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L. J. 267 (1966); WARD BOWMAN, PATENT AND 
ANTITRUST LAW (1973); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1813 (1984); Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From 
Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 Antitrust L. J. 167 (1997); Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the 
Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 761 (2002); ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU 
AND US PERSPECTIVES (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005); THE INTERFACE BETWEEN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY (Steven D. Anderman ed., 2007); Daniel A. 
Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009); MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 
21
ST
 CENTURY (2009); Josef Drexl, Real Knowledge is to Know the Extent of One’s Own Ignorance: On the 
Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 677 (2010).   
2
 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED 
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2010). 
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¶2  The standard argument concerning the patent-antitrust interface is as follows: the 
patent system provides incentives for innovation by granting the innovator a period of 
exclusivity, during which he or she may be able to charge a supra-competitive price for 
its technology or for products incorporating this technology.  The result of this 
exclusivity is that consumers will have to bear a higher price.  It is this supernormal profit 
that is said to allow innovators to recover the costs of innovation.  R&D costs are 
generally thought of as sunk costs.  Without patent protection, competitors will be able to 
imitate the technology quickly and cheaply, driving the price to its marginal costs, which 
of course exclude sunk costs.  Assuming that the marginal costs of production are 
constant,
3
 the innovator will be denied recovery of its R&D costs.  Innovation will hence 
be deterred.  To remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs, the patent system grants the 
innovator the right to exclude and a host of other patent rights.  These rights and the 
patentee reward that they help to generate are crucial to attract innovators, supplying 
them sufficient financial incentives to pursue R&D.  Since innovation is the engine of 
growth in the modern-day economy, innovation should be encouraged as much as 
possible.  The common belief is that more innovation is better for society.  Under this 
tenet, antitrust policy should defer to patent policy unless there is persuasive evidence of 
certain consumer harm, perhaps as in the case of price fixing.
4
   
¶3  The courts often seem all too willing to accept this standard argument and uphold 
patent exploitation practices.  This is in no small part due to a perception that dynamic 
efficiency arguments are difficult to verify. While the courts are ready to challenge 
claims of short-run consumer harm, they have largely withheld scrutiny from arguments 
asserting reduction of innovation incentives.  When a defendant makes a credible claim 
that a certain patent exploitation practice is essential to generating sufficient patentee 
reward, which in turn is essential to securing adequate innovation incentives, the courts 
are generally reluctant to examine to what extent the exploitation practice at issue is 
genuinely essential to the recovery of innovation costs.  They are equally reluctant, if not 
even more so, to question whether patentee reward in general is necessary for attracting 
innovation.  Claims of the deterrence of future innovation are even less susceptible to 
refutation, perhaps because they are by and large empirically unverifiable.  Dynamic 
efficiency arguments at times have come to be treated as a trump card in patent-antitrust 
cases.
5
  
¶4  The goal of this Article is to show that for the courts to attain a more balanced view 
of the patent-antitrust interface, they must begin to scrutinize dynamic efficiency 
arguments.  Claims about harm to innovation incentives should not be accepted at face 
value.  In particular, this Article will attempt to refocus attention on the fundamental 
premise of the patent system that innovators will have sufficient incentives to innovate as 
 
3
 This assumption is important because if marginal costs are rising, the innovator will be able to recover 
at least part of the R&D costs from the sale of the initial units.  Since the equilibrium price is determined by 
the marginal costs of the last unit being sold, and the marginal costs of that unit will be higher than those of 
the infra-marginal ones under an assumption of rising marginal costs, the equilibrium price will necessarily 
exceed the marginal costs of the infra-marginal units, allowing the innovator to recover part of its R&D 
costs.   
4
 In the 1926 General Electric case, the Supreme Court seemed to have suggested that antitrust policy 
yields even in the presence of such conduct.  See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 
192 (1926). 
5
 CSU v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed Cir. 2000); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001).  
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long as their innovation costs are fully compensated.  The reward offered by the patent 
system is not closely calibrated to match innovation costs.  Hence the scope of rights 
permitted by the current patent system may significantly exceed that which is necessary 
to generate innovation.   
¶5  The argument that patent rights must be respected to preserve innovation incentives 
is hence not universally valid.  In fact, there are reasons to believe that it is not so in 
many instances.  This is especially true once one takes into account the various 
alternative ways in which the innovator can appropriate the benefits of its creation 
without the assistance of patents.  As will be explained subsequently, there are a myriad 
of ways that have been found to be even more effective than patent protection in securing 
private returns to innovation.  Incorporating these observations about innovation 
incentives, this Article proposes a “constrained maximization” approach to the patent-
antitrust interface, under which the courts attempt to maximize the net social benefits of 
an innovation subject to the constraint that the private benefits of innovation, which 
include patentee reward and returns from other means of appropriation, must cover 
innovation costs.  Drawing on insights from this approach, this Article will then provide 
practical guidance on how to decide patent-antitrust cases by focusing on the various 
attributes of innovation.   
¶6  This Article is divided into five sections.  Section I provides an overview of the 
policy conflict underlying the patent-antitrust interface and a critical examination of some 
of the approaches that have been proposed to resolve it.  Section II examines the 
theoretical justifications for patent protection and the implications they have for the 
patent-antitrust interface.  In particular, it will be argued that the current assumption 
about the imperative of preserving patentee reward often leads to timid enforcement 
against harmful patent exploitation practices.  Section III attempts to bring the theoretical 
discussion in Section II to a more practical level and offers concrete suggestions on how 
to apply the lessons drawn from the previous Section in actual cases.  Section IV 
illustrates the application of the approach proposed in this Article by applying it to refusal 
to license cases.  Section V concludes the Article. 
I. CONFLICT BETWEEN PATENT LAW AND ANTITRUST—APPARENT OR REAL? 
A. Short-Run Conflict Between Patent and Antitrust 
¶7  The goal of antitrust is to promote consumer welfare by fostering competition on 
the merits and preventing firms from deploying anticompetitive practices to exclude 
rivals and inflict harm on consumers.  Consumer welfare is enhanced when consumers 
are able to obtain the same good at a lower price or obtain a higher-quality good at the 
same price.  Consumer welfare is also improved when consumer choice is widened.  In 
economic parlance, antitrust is principally concerned with static efficiency—the 
allocation of goods and services over the short run.  Dynamic efficiency, which refers to 
the ability of a market or an economy to produce innovation, is also important to 
antitrust.  Meanwhile, patent law spurs invention and innovation
6
 by providing creators of 
 
6
 While invention and innovation may be often used interchangeably in common parlance, economists 
draw a clear distinction between the two terms.  Invention refers to the creation of a new technology or 
product, or a substantial improvement of an existing one.  Innovation refers to the development and 
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patentable inventions a period of exclusivity, during which the patentee has the right to 
exclude anyone from practicing and commercializing the invention.
7
  This exclusivity is 
intended to allow the patentee to impose a supra-competitive price for its innovation so 
that it can recoup its R&D investment.  Users of the innovation and the end consumers 
 
commercialization of a new technology into a good or service that will redound value to consumers.  See 
Stuart Macdonald, Exploring the Hidden Costs of Patents, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 13, 23 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) (“An invention 
is a discovery: an innovation is a product or service that is new to the market, or simply new to the 
adopter.”); Keith E. Maskus, Sean M. Dougherty & Andrew Mertha, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Economic Development in China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM 
RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 295, 299 (Carsten Fink & Keith M. Maskus eds., 2005) (“Invention refers to 
the creation of new knowledge, and innovation (or commercialization) refers to the development of 
marketable products from that knowledge.”).  The differentiation of invention and innovation is said to date 
back to Joseph Schumpeter.  RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC CHANGE 263 (1985).  The two do not necessarily go hand in hand.  As Schumpeter pointed out 
decades ago, it is possible to have innovations without a new invention, whereas invention need not be 
followed by innovation.  JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES : A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS  84-85 (1939). 
One of the controversies regarding patent protection on the one hand, and invention and innovation on 
the other hand, is whether the patent system should aim to provide incentives only to invent, or also to 
innovate and commercialize inventions.  Some believe that the patent system should only be concerned 
with inventions, while others insist that patents must provide incentives for both inventions and innovation.  
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85
TH
 
CONG. 2D SESS. AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 9 (Comm. Print 1958) (written by 
Professor Fritz Machlup) (“[i]t is invention rather than enterprising innovation which the patent system is 
supposed to encourage.”); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE 65-67 (2002) 
(using ancient China, ancient Rome and the former Soviet Union to illustrate that innovation is more 
important than invention in promoting economic growth); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 43 (2004) (using Xerox’s photocopying machine to illustrate that patent 
protection must aim to provide incentives both to invent and to innovate).  Some have even argued that the 
patent system should only protect innovation.  DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 1-34 (William 
Kingston ed., 1987) (proposing property right system that comes into effect only when new product is 
introduced to market).  There has been no definitive resolution of this debate.  See F.M. Scherer, The 
Economics of the Patent System, in INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 439, 
441 (F.M. Scherer ed. 1980) (hereinafter “Economics of Patent System”).   
This Article will make no attempt to resolve this debate.  In keeping with the more contemporary views 
of commentators such as Baumol, Jaffe, and Lerner, it will proceed on the premise that patent protection 
provides incentives for both invention and innovation.  These two terms, and the related terms of 
“inventors” and “innovators,” will thus be used interchangeably in this Article as far as their relationship 
with patent.  Efforts will be made to specify the sense in which the two terms are used where necessary.   
7
 The right to exclude granted by the patent law to the patentee is sometimes known as patent monopoly.  
See Int’l Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 792 F.2d 416, 426 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Since patent law grants 
a patent holder the right to exclude others for a period of seventeen years, the property right thereby created 
is often referred to as either a limited or patent monopoly.  Even though the patent statute does not describe 
a patent “monopoly,” the exclusive rights granted to a patent holder permit exploitation of the patent free 
from competition for seventeen years and amount to no less however called.”).  While that term may be apt 
in a loose sense, in a strict antitrust sense, patents need not confer a monopoly.  Whether patent exclusivity 
confers monopoly power crucially depends on the existence of alternatives to the patented technology, 
barriers of entry to the innovation market, and the availability of substitutes in the final product market.  In 
fact, a patent does not confer a monopoly in most cases.  Therefore, for the sake of accuracy, this Article 
will use the term “patent exclusivity” rather than “patent monopoly.”   
Posner and Landes similarly criticize this lack of precision in terminology, arguing that the facile 
characterization of patent exclusivity as monopoly “led judges to suppose that there is an inherent tension 
between intellectual property law, because it confers ‘monopolies,’ and antitrust law, which is dedicated to 
overthrowing monopolies.  That was a mistake.  At one level it is confusion of a property right with a 
monopoly.” WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 374 (2003).  
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will thus have to pay a higher price for the technology in the short run.  An economy’s 
ability to generate innovations over time is known as dynamic efficiency.  Under patent 
law, static efficiency, or short-run consumer welfare, is sacrificed for dynamic efficiency.  
¶8  Based on this basic view of the goals of patent and antitrust laws, a number of 
courts have noted the tension between them, at least over the short term.  In SCM Corp. v. 
Xerox Corp., the Second Circuit observed that: 
The conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they 
embrace that were designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws 
proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the 
inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive 
exploitation of his patented art.
8
   
In International Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., the Fourth Circuit expressed a 
similar view that “there may be conflict between the patent laws on the one hand, which 
encourage monopoly power by granting patent holders the right to exclude and be free 
from competition, and the antitrust laws, on the other hand, which generally proscribe 
monopoly and encourage competition.”9  Commentators have similarly remarked on the 
conflict between patent and antitrust.  In his seminal article on the patent-antitrust 
interface, Professor Louis Kaplow characterizes this conflict as “even more deep-seated 
than is generally perceived.”10   
¶9  The conflict between these two bodies of law has also been described as overstated.  
It has been argued that they in fact share similar goals.  Like patent law, antitrust is 
concerned with dynamic efficiency.  This concern is motivated by the fact that in the long 
run, the greatest enhancement to consumer welfare comes not from lower prices obtained 
from static competition, but from the emergence of new technology and new products.  
There is a wealth of economic evidence that shows that innovation has been the single 
most significant source of economic growth and improvement in general welfare.
11
  
Meanwhile, patent law also considers consumer welfare and is cognizant of the harm that 
patent exclusivity inflicts on consumers.  The tradeoff between static welfare loss from 
short-run supra-competitive pricing and dynamic efficiency gains from more abundant 
innovation over time is said to be implicitly struck by Congress when it set the length and 
breadth of patent rights.  
¶10  This more conciliatory view of the patent-antitrust conflict has received support 
from a number of prominent scholars in antitrust, patent, and innovation economics.  
Professor Suzanne Scotchmer, a leading innovation economist, believes that the tension 
 
8
 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d. Cir. 1981).   
9
 Int’l Wood Processors, 792 F.2d at 426.  
10
 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1815-16 
(1984); see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property 
Monopoly, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (1998) (recognizing conflict between two bodies of law); David 
McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24 J. CORP. L. 485, 485, n. 1 
(1999) (same).   
11
 Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65 (1956); 
Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. STATS. 312 
(1957); Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002 (1986); 
ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 34-54 (2004).   
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between patent and antitrust only exists in the short run.
12
  Professor Mark Lemley, a 
leading patent scholar, characterizes the view that antitrust focuses on static efficiency 
while patent law pursues dynamic efficiency as “oversimplified.”13  Professor Herbert 
Hovenkamp, the author of the leading antitrust treatise, calls the patent-antitrust conflict 
“readily exaggerated.”14  He notes that in most cases in which there is an appearance of a 
conflict, a deeper understanding of patent and antitrust policies will help one realize that 
none exists.
15
  In the few cases that do present a genuine conflict, “a significant portion of 
it is explained by deep uncertainty about the optimal amount and scope of IP protection.  
As long as that uncertainty remains, there will always be tension between IP and 
antitrust.”16  This is a key insight into the patent-antitrust interface.  The conflict between 
these two areas of law is the most acute when antitrust policy may undermine innovation 
incentives by limiting a patentee’s ability to exploit its patent.   
¶11  Between these two areas of law, antitrust is probably the one with better-defined 
goals and policies.
17
  There is a clear consensus that antitrust protects consumer welfare.  
The major theoretical debates in the field focus on how this is achieved in different 
contexts, such as resale price maintenance and unilateral conduct by a monopolist, which 
remains highly controversial.  While the calibration and implementation of antitrust 
policy in these contexts may seem open-ended, the goals are fairly well defined: the 
maximization of consumer welfare through competition, both in terms of product and 
innovation.
18
  Antitrust encourages firms to compete in both the final product market and 
the technology market.  As far as the patent-antitrust interface is concerned, the two 
paramount considerations for antitrust are the consumer harm resulting from restrictive 
patent exploitation practices and foreclosure of innovation opportunities by a dominant 
patentee against rival technology developers.  
¶12  Patent law does not share the same clarity in policy.19  The primary goal of patent 
law of course is to encourage innovation.  Patent law, however, does not pursue 
innovation at all costs.  Otherwise, it would have stipulated exclusivity of unlimited 
duration and a much more expansive scope of rights.  As some commentators have 
recognized, there can be too much innovation.  Innovation is excessive when the social 
costs of an innovation outweigh its social benefits.  Society as a whole would be better 
off if the resources devoted to develop that innovation are channeled to alternative uses 
instead.  Professors Michele Boldrin and David Levine formulate the test slightly 
 
12
 SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 161 (2004) (“This is more a short-run tension 
than a long run tension, since in the long run intellectual property law leads to innovation, which improves 
the welfare of consumers.  Since consumer welfare is the concern of competition law, there is no 
fundamental inconsistency.”).   
13
 Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation 2 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670197 [hereinafter Industry-Specific Policy].   
14
 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 247, 247 (2007) [hereinafter 
Restraints on Innovation]. 
15
 Id. at 247-48.    
16
 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, United States Antitrust Policy in an Age of IP Expansion, in INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW 225, 226 (Barry Hawk ed., 2004) [hereinafter Age 
of IP Expansion].   
17
 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY 1979, 1982 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008) [hereinafter Intellectual Property-
Antitrust Interface].   
18
 Id. at 1982; Age of IP Expansion, supra note 16, at 226.   
19
 Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface, supra note 17, at 1983.   
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differently, asserting that an optimal level of innovation is attained when the value of an 
innovation as determined in a competitive market covers its R&D costs.
20
  Beyond that, 
innovation becomes excessive.  To take a systemic perspective, patent protection is 
optimal when the marginal social benefits of protection equals its marginal social costs.
21
  
It should be obvious that such a condition for optimality requires balancing of 
countervailing policy considerations and results in less determinacy in patent policy than 
the focus on consumer welfare found in antitrust law. 
B. Long-Run Divergences Between Patent and Antitrust 
¶13  The conciliatory view that the tension between patent and antitrust is confined to 
the short run is overly optimistic; the conflict in fact extends to the long run.  While it is 
true that both antitrust and patent laws seek to encourage innovation, they seem to share 
contrary visions of what kind of market structure is most conducive to it.  This harkens to 
the Schumpeter-Arrow debate that has been continuing in economics since Joseph 
Schumpeter first made the famous claims that a monopolist may have greater incentives 
than competitive firms to innovate and that markets progress through creative destruction 
whereby firms compete for the market through innovation, displacing an old monopoly 
with a new one.
22
  Kenneth Arrow and others have since challenged these claims, 
asserting that innovation is more abundant in a competitive environment.
23
  According to 
Arrow, monopolists tend to avoid drastic innovations that will displace its existing 
product in the market.  A monopolist’s competitors do not bear the cost of the loss of 
profit from its previous dominant product, and a monopolist may not stand to gain much 
from innovation.  This is known as the replacement effect, which deters innovation by 
monopolists.  This debate has spawned a large body of literature, both empirical and 
theoretical, that seeks to verify Schumpeter and Arrow’s claims.24  It remains largely 
unresolved.
25
   
 
20
 MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 127 (2008).  This, 
again, is an important insight.  As will be explained subsequently, there is a tendency in the existing 
literature to assume that patentee reward should allow the patentee to capture the full value of its 
innovation.  Allowing the patentee to do so would amount to a windfall.  The patent system, in conjunction 
with antitrust law, provides sufficient incentives to potential inventors so long as they are allowed to 
recover their R&D expenditure, including the opportunity costs of innovation (what the inventor would 
have earned in its next best endeavor).   
In fact, it has been widely noted in the economics literature that competitive patent races can result in 
substantial waste in resources.  The R&D effort invested by firms to win the race is excessive.  See, e.g., 
Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 
266 (1980); Jennifer F. Reinganum, A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive 
Behavior, 50 ECONOMETRICA 671 (1982); Pankaj Tandon, Rivalry and the Excessive Allocation of 
Resources to Research 14 BELL J. ECON. 152 (1983); Partha Dasgupta & Paul Stoneman, The Economic 
Theory of Technology Policy: An Introduction, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 
18-21 (Partha Dasgupta & Paul Stoneman eds, 1987).   
21
 Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1825-26. 
22
 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 87-120 (2010). 
23
 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619-20 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research ed., 1962). 
24
 Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q.J. ECON. 701 
(2005) (positing inverted-U relationship between market concentration and innovation performance); 
Richard J. Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate?, in 
6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159 (Josh Lerner et al. eds., 2006) (same); Richard J. Gilbert & 
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¶14  While the academic debate still rages, policymakers and enforcers nonetheless must 
take an explicit or implicit view of the matter.  Given the fundamental belief in antitrust 
that competition is inherently beneficial to society and is the engine of economic 
progress, it should come as no surprise that antitrust generally subscribes to the Arrowian 
view.  For example, in the Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission 1995 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, the two agencies identified as a 
potential harm of cross-licensing arrangements and patent pools the possibility of a 
reduction in innovation competition.
26
  According to Scotchmer, this theory of harm is 
premised on “the economic hypothesis that competition leads to more R&D than 
cooperation.”27  In his advocacy for robust antitrust enforcement to foster innovation, 
Professor Jonathan Baker posits that firms innovate in an attempt to escape product 
market competition.
28
  In the eyes of antitrust enforcers and commentators alike, 
competition promotes innovation.  
¶15  Given the ideological underpinning of patent law and its expansionist tendencies 
over the last two decades, one may conclude that patent law emerges on the 
Schumpeterian end of the debate.  A preoccupation with promoting technological 
competition is generally absent in patent doctrines.  The increasingly relaxed standard for 
patentability and the expanding scope of patent rights mean that it is easier than before 
for an innovator to exclude rivals from competition.  This enhanced ability to exclude in 
turn facilitates the acquisition of market power in the product market.  If the central 
policy goal of patent law is to encourage innovation, the implicit assumption seems to be 
that dominant firms produce more innovation.  Moreover, patent law has not been 
particularly accommodating to follow-on innovation, which may often compete with the 
original one.  The Federal Circuit has interpreted the doctrine of reverse equivalents very 
narrowly, which allows a literally infringing invention to escape infringement if it 
represents a substantial improvement of the patented technology.
29
  A more liberal 
application of this equitable doctrine would allow follow-on innovators to pursue 
substantial improvements without fear of infringement or strategic behavior by the initial 
innovator.  Not only is the reverse equivalents doctrine rarely invoked, but there are even 
doubts as to its continual validity.
30
  It thus seems that patent law does not actively 
encourage innovation through competition, evincing a Schumpeterian view of innovation. 
 
Steven C. Sunshine, The Use of Innovation Markets: A Reply to Hay, Rapp and Hoerner, 64 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 75 (1995) (summarizing relevant literature).    
25
 SCOTCHMER, supra note 12, at 173 (noting that whether competition delivers more innovation than 
concentrated markets depends on a range of factors); F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1011 (1987) [hereinafter Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress] (“When the general 
advance of knowledge opens up opportunities for technological improvements at a fast pace, innovation is 
likely to proceed most rapidly under relatively fragmented (but not atomistic) market structural conditions.  
When the relevant knowledge base advances slowly, monopolies or tightly-knit oligopolies are likely to 
innovate more rapidly than fragmented industries.”).  Cf. Industry-Specific Policy, supra note 13, at 2 (“In 
fact, however, there is substantial evidence suggesting competition itself may act as a greater spur to 
innovation than monopoly.”). 
26
 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property (1995) 28-29, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132.   
27
 SCOTCHMER, supra note 12, at 172.  
28
 Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation 7 (June 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962261.  
29
 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1657 (2003). 
30
 Tate Access Floors v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (suggesting 
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C. Theoretical Approaches to the Patent-Antitrust Interface 
1. Michael Carrier’s Innovation-Based Framework 
¶16  Given the theoretical complexity of the patent-antitrust interface, it is no surprise 
that it has been the subject of much scholarly writing over the years.  Commentators have 
suggested a variety of approaches to the patent-antitrust interface.  Professor Michael 
Carrier argues that dynamic efficiency considerations should trump consumer welfare 
concerns in patent-antitrust cases.
31
  He proposed a framework for resolving patent-
antitrust cases in which a presumption of legality applies to a patent exploitation practice 
if the patentee can provide a plausible business justification that is only rebutted if a 
plaintiff can show that innovation is easy to create or difficult to imitate, contending that 
there are market-based incentives for innovation, and that innovation in the industry tends 
to be cumulative.
32
  The defendant is then allowed to establish the sur-rebuttal by 
furnishing evidence of innovation in the industry.
33
  There is no meaningful balancing of 
the conflicting static and dynamic efficiency considerations underlying the patent-
antitrust interface, which he believes to be beyond judicial capability.
34
   
¶17  Carrier does not seem to limit the sur-rebuttal to patentable innovations; he only 
requires evidence of innovation.
35
  Given this broad understanding of innovation, it 
would take an unusually stagnant industry to deny the defendant evidence to establish the 
sur-rebuttal.  The consequence is that patent exploitation practices will be almost always 
upheld.
36
   
¶18  An anomaly in Carrier’s innovation-based framework is that it attempts to resolve 
two areas of law that individually balance static and dynamic efficiencies without 
resorting to balancing.  While Carrier’s framework would certainly improve 
administrability—it effectively simplifies the entire patent-antitrust enterprise into one 
inquiry: the existence of innovation of any kind in an industry—it overlooks the reality 
that restrictive patent exploitation practices can and do harm consumers.  
Administrability is achieved by ignoring one side of the balance altogether.  
Unfortunately, the existence of innovation in an industry does not render irrelevant the 
potential consumer harm of these practices.  Concerns about judicial competence do not 
warrant jettisoning the fundamental considerations of antitrust from the analysis 
altogether.  Therefore, while one must be mindful of the limits of judicial competence in 
 
that doctrine had no further relevance after passage of the 1952 Patent Act).   
31
 Carrier, supra note 1, at 816-33.  
32
 Id. at 817-19.  
33
 Carrier seems to have implicitly accepted the view that consumer welfare has been adequately taken 
into account within patent law. 
34
 Id. at 799-800. 
35
 In fact, one may argue that given today’s relaxed standard for patentability, even an insistence of 
patentable innovations would not have been much of a hurdle.  JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 6, at 142-43 
(“While there is a formal process of patent examination, in practice the system seems more akin to a 
registration system: in many cases it appears that a determined patentee can get almost any award he 
seeks.”). 
36
 If one examines closely the way Carrier’s framework is constructed, the rebuttal, the most complex 
step in it, is largely superfluous.  When confronted by a challenge to a patent exploitation practice, an 
antitrust court need only ask itself whether there is evidence of innovation in the industry.  If so, the case is 
closed and the practice is upheld.   
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antitrust cases, it is equally important not to underestimate it and over-simplify the 
analysis in the name of administrability. 
2. Louis Kaplow’s Ratio Test 
¶19  Of all the approaches that have been proposed for the patent-antitrust interface, 
Professor Louis Kaplow’s framework remains the most sophisticated and nuanced.37  The 
pivot of Kaplow’s framework is the ratio test, which is defined as patentee reward 
divided by monopoly loss.  Patentee reward and monopoly loss refer to the incremental 
reward and loss caused by a patent exploitation practice.
38
  There is a ratio associated 
with every type of patent exploitation practice.
39
  In order to determine whether antitrust 
law should permit a particular patent exploitation practice, the ratio associated with that 
practice is compared with a benchmark ratio of some kind.  The benchmark suggested by 
Kaplow is the patentee reward-monopoly loss ratio implicit in the optimal patent life.
40
  
This ratio represents the most cost-effective way society can induce invention by 
adjusting patent life.  If a ratio associated with a particular patent exploitation practice is 
lower than the optimal ratio, the practice  should be prohibited.  If it is higher than the 
optimal ratio, the practice should be allowed, subject to the requirement that patent life 
should be shortened accordingly.   
¶20  Despite the theoretical elegance of his framework, Kaplow himself acknowledges 
that there are considerable obstacles to applying it in real-world contexts.  As a second-
best solution, Kaplow proposes a cost-effectiveness analysis, which requires the antitrust 
agency to derive the ratio for all possible patent exploitation practices and align them 
from the highest to the lowest.  A comparison can then be made of the practices that are 
currently allowed and prohibited to ensure that the total reward is obtained from practices 
that have the highest ratios.
41
  However, he believes that even this second-best 
formulation is probably too difficult to apply.  In its place Kaplow suggests a number of 
factors which would facilitate the application of the test, including “the extent to which 
the reward is pure transfer, the portion of the reward that accrues to the patentee, and the 
degree to which the reward serves as an incentive.”42  When applying his framework to 
 
37
 Kaplow, supra note 1.  
38
 The reason that patentee reward as opposed to marginal social benefit is used is because the optimum 
patent life is set as given, which is determined by the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost of granting 
patent protection.  Once the optimum patent life has been set, what the ratio test seeks to answer is “whether the 
total reward to the patentee implicit in the optimal patent life can be achieved at a lower cost.”  Kaplow, supra 
note 1, at 1831. 
39
 Strictly speaking, there is a ratio associated with every patent exploitation practice for every patent, 
because patentee reward depends on “a number of factors, including the market value of the invention, the 
structure of the market involving the patented process or product, and the attributes of the patentee (such as 
marketing and production capacities) that determine its range of options within the market.”  Id. at 1823.  
However, for ease of application, it is assumed that there is a generalized ratio for every type of patent 
exploitation practice.  
40
 When determining the optimal patent life by comparing the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost 
of granting patent protection, the policymaker will implicitly determine an optimal patentee reward-monopoly 
loss ratio.  This is because marginal social benefit is dependent on incremental patentee reward, and monopoly 
loss is one very important component of the marginal social cost.   
41
 This analysis is called the cost-effectiveness analysis because the goal of the exercise is to obtain the same 
total reward in the most cost-effective manner, i.e., by incurring the least aggregate monopoly loss.   
42
 Id. at 1842. The first of these factors requires some explanation.  By a pure transfer, Kaplow refers to a 
situation in which a patent exploitation practice results in transfer of surplus from one group in society to 
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concrete examples of patent exploitation practices, Kaplow focuses on the effects of a 
practice on the ratio’s denominator and numerator.  Therefore, if a practice were likely to 
result in a substantial increase in patentee reward without a proportionate increase in 
monopoly loss, Kaplow would permit it.  An example would be a practice that effectuates 
a pure transfer.  If a practice has the opposite effects on the denominator and the 
numerator, Kaplow would prohibit it.  An example would be a price fixing cartel 
disguised as a licensing arrangement with price restrictions. 
¶21  There are two important omissions, however, in Kaplow’s framework.  First, there 
is insufficient consideration of the extent to which patentee reward provides incentives to 
innovate.
43
  Kaplow posits a three-step causal link between patentee reward and social 
benefits.  The first is that an increase in patent term or an expansion of the scope of 
permissible patent exploitation increases patentee reward, which in turn incentivizes 
innovation, which in turns redounds benefits to society.  His ratio test takes as a given 
that all three steps in the link are valid, which allows him to focus on the relationship 
between antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation and patentee reward.  While he does 
briefly discuss how innovators may perceive patentee reward from different types of 
restrictive practices differently, he fails to consider the more crucial question of the 
incentive effect of patentee reward.
44
   
¶22  Kaplow acknowledges that “our knowledge of the functional relationships between 
the separate links in the chain connecting patent life to social benefits remains quite 
limited.”45  That was true in 1984. Our understanding of the relationship between 
patentee reward and innovation incentives has substantially improved since then.  There 
is now a wealth of theoretical and empirical economic literature that questions the second 
step in Kaplow’s causal chain.  Once the causal chain breaks down, one can no longer 
focus on patentee reward, and must begin to consider difficult questions about whether 
the static efficiency loss caused by a patent exploitation practice serves any useful social 
purpose, or is merely a windfall to patentees.  In other words, instead of focusing on 
patentee reward, the inquiry must directly address innovation incentives and the social 
benefits of patent protection.  A focus on innovation incentives requires us to distinguish 
between different types of innovation.   
¶23  As it turns out, the degree of dependency on patent protection for innovation 
incentives varies across types of innovation.  For example, economists have found that, 
perhaps due to the greater difficulty for rivals to reverse engineer contemporary 
technology, process innovation tends to be less reliant than product innovation on patents 
for protection.
46
  In fact, patentee reward was found to be the least important means by 
which an innovator reaps benefits from process innovation.  The diversity of innovation 
 
another, such as licensees to the patentee, without an attendant increase in deadweight loss.  In the case of a pure 
transfer, the patentee reward may increase substantially without a corresponding increase in monopoly loss.  
Therefore, all else being equal, a patent exploitation practice that results in a pure transfer is to be preferred to 
one that does not.   
43
 While he includes the relationship between patentee reward and innovation incentives as one of the 
factors in his third-best formulation of the ratio test, he does not provide very detailed guidance on how this 
factor should be applied in the analysis.  This Article seeks to remedy that.   
44
 Id. at 1838. 
45
 Id. at 1824. 
46
 Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, in 
1987:3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783, 794–95 (1987). 
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will be explored in greater detail in Section Error! Reference source not found..  
Suffice it for now to note that Kaplow overlooked this very important issue.   
¶24  Second, Kaplow’s framework pays scant attention to the importance of cumulative 
innovation, and how patent exploitation practices may hamper such innovation.  Given 
the dual focus of his framework on patentee reward and monopoly loss, cumulative 
innovation cannot be easily incorporated.  Again, since his article, economists have 
substantially improved our understanding of innovation generally and cumulative 
innovation in particular.  Cumulative innovation has been shown to be of great 
importance to technological progress, and patent exploitation practices may significantly 
affect the prospects of cumulative innovation.  Therefore, cumulative innovation must be 
incorporated in the analysis.  The loss of potential cumulative innovation represents a 
serious social cost of patent rights, and hence belongs to the denominator side of his ratio.  
Just as the numerator has been redefined to focus on innovation incentives and social 
benefits, the denominator also needs to take into account loss of cumulative innovation.   
¶25  One further weakness in Kaplow’s framework is its universalist approach to the 
optimization of the scope of patent protection and patent-antitrust rules.  He attempts to 
obtain one optimal patent life and one patentee reward-monopoly ratio for each and every 
patent exploitation practice, regardless of the market environment in which it is pursued.  
He fails to consider the possibility that the optimization exercise may yield different 
results according to the industry, or even the type of innovation, at issue.
47
  Economic 
literature suggests that the importance of patent protection as a source of innovation 
incentives differs widely by industry and type of innovation.  A one-size-fits-all approach 
to the optimization exercise is hence inappropriate.  It would perpetuate the crudeness of 
the tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiencies inhered in the patent system, which 
will be discussed below.  While patent law, at least the statutory part of it, may be bound 
to such a universalist approach (unless Congress decided to take an industry-specific 
approach to patent protection), there is no reason that antitrust should not take advantage 
of the case-specific nature of its decision-making process to take full account of the 
characteristics of the industry and the innovation at issue.  This is what the approach to 
the patent-antitrust interface proposed in the next Section endeavors to do. 
D. Judicial Deference to Dynamic Efficiency Considerations 
¶26  Before launching a theoretical examination of the patent-antitrust interface, it is 
important to examine the prevailing judicial attitude toward it.  The patent-antitrust 
interface requires a balancing between static and dynamic efficiencies.  Dynamic 
efficiency considerations are by nature long term.  Innovation can take years to 
accomplish, especially for research- and resource-intensive R&D activities such as those 
found in the pharmaceutical industry.
48
  To complicate matters further, innovation can be 
highly uncertain.  R&D efforts obviously can succeed or fail.  An assessment of dynamic 
efficiency considerations may require the antitrust courts to enter the perilous territory of 
 
47
 This oversight again is excusable because awareness of the industry-specific variations in dependence 
on innovation incentives only came about since the publication of Kaplow’s article.  Kaplow’s framework 
indeed reflects the state-of-the-art of our knowledge about the patent system in 1984.  
48
 Burk & Lemley, supra note 29, at 1581 (noting that the entire development process for a new drug 
can take a decade). 
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estimating the likelihood of success for R&D projects.  These myriad complications 
mean that the antitrust courts are generally loathe to second-guess dynamic efficiency 
arguments.  It sometimes seems that if a dynamic efficiency argument passes the muster 
of minimum credibility, the courts defer to it.
49
  It is aptly illustrated by the D.C. Circuit’s 
treatment of Microsoft’s arguments regarding its development of a Java Virtual Machine 
that is incompatible with its rival Sun Microsystem’s version.  The court was unwilling to 
scrutinize the veracity of Microsoft’s innovation even though there was ample evidence 
that Microsoft had developed its own Java Virtual Machine with the express goal to 
create confusion in the market and to undermine Sun’s product.50  Similarly, in predatory 
product design cases, the courts have been reluctant to challenge innovation-based 
defenses to predatory product design claims unless there is clear evidence of predatory 
intent on the part of the defendant to use a technological feature to exclude rivals.
51
  This 
deferential judicial attitude toward innovation is also evident in other important patent-
antitrust cases.
52
  
¶27  While a prudent approach to dynamic efficiency arguments is commendable, this 
author believes that the antitrust courts have shown too much deference to them.  The 
tradeoff in patent law between static and dynamic efficiencies was made when Congress 
set the patent term and the scope of patent rights.  The one-size-fits-all approach under 
the patent statute means that the balance struck is necessarily a crude one.
53
  This balance 
thus should not be assumed to be universally optimal.  Furthermore, while it is true that 
longer-term and more general policy judgments are usually left to the legislature and that 
innovation-based arguments are by nature long-term, it is not true that only Congress is 
equipped to make policy judgments concerning innovation.  Even in patent law, the 
courts are actively involved in fashioning micro policy decisions through individual 
cases.  Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have argued that patent law provides the 
courts with a range of micro and macro policy levers to make sector-specific adjustments 
to the various parameters of patentability and patent rights.
54
  These decisions may have 
long-term and broad implications for innovation policy.  The Federal Circuit’s decision to 
permit patents for business methods is a case on point.
55
 
 
49
 In fact, according to Professor Michael Carrier, this is exactly what the courts should do. Carrier, 
supra note 1, at 762–64. 
50
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  Admittedly, there was evidence 
that Microsoft’s Java Virtual Machine was superior to Sun’s in some ways.  This case thus presented a 
particularly difficult set of facts to the court.   
51
 See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
52
 See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 
U.S. 163 (1931); Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 
F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Cinram, 299 F.Supp.2d 370 (D. Del. 2004); In 
re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (Xerox), 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Filmtec Corp. v. 
Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261 (7th 
Cir. 1984); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983); Berkey Photo, 
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).   
53
 There are of course sector-specific statutes such as the Semiconductor Integrated-Circuit Layout-
Design Act 2000 and the Hatch-Waxman Act that make adjustments to this uniform approach. 
54
 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 29, at 1638–67.  They note, however, that while judicial application 
of patent law is at times industry-specific, “there is no reason to believe that these [sector-specific] 
differences in the law represent a reasoned response to industry differences.”  Id. at 1577.  In fact, they 
assert that with respect to biotechnology and software, the Federal Circuit “has gotten the policy precisely 
backwards.”  Id. at 1578.   
  
Vol. 11:5] Thomas Cheng 
 399 
¶28  Policy decisions of general application, such as the length of patent term (and 
arguably a dramatic extension of patentable subject matter such as that undertaken in 
State Street Bank), no doubt should be reserved for Congress.  In contrast, micro policy 
decisions about the optimal scope of patent rights in a particular case, which antitrust 
courts make when determining the legality of patent exploitation practices, are rightfully 
the province of the judiciary.  These decisions present no greater obstacles to the antitrust 
courts than do merger review cases.  There is no reason to believe that forecasting how a 
market will be affected by a merger transaction and how competitors will interact with 
each other afterward is any more difficult than predicting how a patent exploitation 
practice will impact innovation.  If the antitrust courts can handle merger review cases, 
applying meaningful scrutiny to innovation-based arguments should not elude them.  The 
long-term nature of dynamic efficiency considerations is a reason for caution, not 
abdication of responsibility, by the antitrust courts. 
II. A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERFACE 
A. An Overview 
¶29  As suggested by Hovenkamp,56 much of the confusion regarding the patent-
antitrust interface stems from the lack of consensus about the optimal amount of patent 
protection.  Antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation affect the scope and the exercise 
of patent rights, which in turn alters the size of patentee reward.  As such, the patent-
antitrust rules are an integral part in the determination of the optimal patent protection 
(i.e., how many incentives to offer to induce innovation).  At the same time, it is 
impossible to delineate the optimal scope of the patent-antitrust rules without placing 
these rules in the context of the overall determination of optimal patent protection.  The 
patent-antitrust rules are but one of the many pieces of the puzzle.  
¶30  There are four relevant parameters in the determination of optimal patent 
protection: (1) social benefits; (2) social costs; (3) private benefits; and, (4) private costs 
of patent protection.
57
  Social benefits can be broken down to external benefits and 
private benefits.  Likewise, social costs can be broken down to external costs and private 
costs.  Private costs and benefits are those that directly affect the innovator in question.  
To simplify, they are the rewards received by the innovator from its innovation and the 
R&D costs incurred by the innovator to develop the technology.  External benefits and 
costs are those that affect other firms in the industry and society as a result of the 
innovation.  
¶31  The external benefits of patent protection include the direct benefits of the 
innovation for society.  For example, if an innovation is a cost-reducing technology, its 
direct social benefit is the cost savings achieved by society from the adoption of the 
 
56
 Age of IP Expansion, supra note 16, at 226. 
57
 Here it is assumed that the social costs and benefits of patent protection encompass those of the 
underlying innovation that is being patented.  The tacit assumption is that the innovation at issue would not 
have been created absent patent protection.  Strictly speaking, the social benefits and costs of patent 
protection are only the value and costs of innovation that would not have been created without patent 
protection.  Some, and perhaps a great amount of, innovation may still be created in the absence of a patent 
system.  This distinction would be important for more systemic issues such as whether a patent system 
should be instituted.  On the level of individual innovations, for the purpose of our inquiry, it is appropriate 
to assume that the social costs and benefits of patent protection and innovation are the same.   
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technology.
58
  If an innovation is the development of a new product, the direct social 
benefit is the additional amount that consumers are willing to pay for this product, or the 
difference in consumers’ willingness to pay for the improved as compared to the original 
products.
59
  As the term “direct social benefits” suggests, social benefits can also be 
indirect.  These encompass the beneficial impact of an innovation on the R&D programs 
conducted by other firms in the industry and on the economy in general,
60
 and the 
possibility of follow-on innovation built on this present innovation. Indirect social 
benefits or spillovers of innovation can be substantial.
61
  Professor William Baumol 
estimates that innovators are able to capture only 20% of the value created by their 
innovations; the remaining 80% of the value benefits the rest of society.
62
  He argues that 
without these spillovers, a majority of the industrialized world would be condemned to a 
pre-Industrial Revolution standard of living.
63
  Other studies have similarly ascertained 
the magnitude by which social benefits of an innovation exceed its private benefits.
64
  
What is particularly noteworthy about these indirect social benefits is the impact of 
cumulative innovation on overall social welfare.  Many commentators have noted the 
importance of cumulative innovation to technological development.
65
  Therefore, to the 
extent that patent-antitrust rules affect the pursuit of cumulative innovation by other 
firms, these effects must be taken into account. 
¶32  There are two main types of social costs of patent protection.  The first is one with 
which antitrust commentators are most familiar, the deadweight loss created by the supra-
competitive pricing imposed by the patentee.  From a social perspective, this cost should 
be minimized to the extent possible without substantially undermining innovation 
 
58
 Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 29, 31 (1991).  
59
 Id. 
60
 The beneficial impact of the new knowledge need not be confined to the industry itself, and may 
enhance the R&D efforts of firms in other industries.  This is especially like with general-purpose 
technology, such as computers and the internet, whose beneficial impact on innovation clearly extends 
beyond the boundaries of their own respective industries.   
61
 Baumol refers to the indirect external benefits of innovation as spillovers. BAUMOL, supra note 6, at 
124. 
62
 Id. at 121, 134–35. But see BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 20, at 163–66 (disputing claims that 
spillovers of innovation are substantial).  
63
 Id. at 125.   
64
 See Jeffrey I. Berstein, The Structure of Canadian Industry R&D Spillovers, and the Rates of Return 
to R&D, 37 J. INDUS. ECON. 315, 315-28 (1989) (social value of innovation at least twice as high as private 
value for industries studied); Timothy F. Bresnahan, Measuring the Spillovers from Technical Advance: 
Mainframe Computers in Financial Services, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 742, 753 (1986) (social benefits from 
mainframe computers very substantial); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging 
Innovation, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1137, 1141 (1998); Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return 
from Industrial Innovations, 91 Q. J. ECON. 221, 234 (1977).  
65
 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 839, 843–44, 870 (1990) (arguing that patent scope decisions should allow competitive 
environment for follow-on innovation); John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking of Patent 
Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L. J. 449, 453 (1997) (arguing that follow-on innovators 
deserve more protection); Joel Mokyr, The Industrial Revolution and the New Economic History, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1 (Joel Mokyr ed., 1989) (“The cumulative effect of small 
improvements made by mostly anonymous workers and technicians was often more important than most of 
the great inventions.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
Tex. L. Rev. 989, 997 (1997) [hereinafter Economics of Improvement”] (“And since ‘improvements’ may 
in many cases dwarf the original work in terms of their practical significance, dynamic market efficiency 
over different generations demands such access as well.”). 
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incentives.  Another social cost is less well-documented and perhaps less understood.  
This refers to the cost imposed by a new innovation on the producers of an existing 
product, and is sometimes known as the costs of creative destruction.  To the extent that 
the new innovation renders existing products in the market obsolete, the machineries that 
these firms have installed, and the plants that these firms have constructed, to produce 
their now-obsolete products may become redundant.
66
  Digital photography, which has 
practically rendered traditional film photography redundant, at least for the leisure 
photographers, serves as a fitting example.  The machines and plants built to produce 
films and film cameras have largely lost their productive value.  Firms certainly do not 
take into account these welfare losses suffered by their rivals when deciding whether to 
pursue an innovation.  If anything, they may prefer to inflict these losses on rival firms.  
However, from a social perspective, these losses could be so high as to outweigh the 
benefits brought forth by the innovation.
67
  It is possible for society to be better off 
without it.   
¶33  Finally, another important social cost is the various administrative costs of the 
patent system.  These include the operating costs of the Patent and Trademark Office and 
the courts, the fees and expenses incurred by patent applicants, and the legal costs 
incurred by parties in patent litigation.  These costs are no doubt substantial.
68
  They are, 
however, mostly relevant on a systemic level.  They should have little relevance when 
determining optimal patent protection in individual cases.   
¶34  Private benefits of innovation and private benefits of patent protection must be 
clearly distinguished.  This distinction will have considerable relevance to the resolution 
of the patent-antitrust conflict.  Private benefits of patent protection are estimated against 
the counterfactual of what would the reward to the patentee be absent patent protection,
69
 
or in other words, private benefits are the additional value patent protection creates for 
the innovator.  Private benefits of innovation consist of all the revenue earned by the 
innovator from the exploitation of its innovation, including sale of the final product 
incorporating the patented technology, licensing of the technology, or even the sale of it 
in the form of an assignment.
70
   
¶35   While licensing and assignment of technology depends on patent 
protection, product sale does not necessarily rely on it.  As it turns out, firms have a 
variety of ways to capture the benefits of their innovation.  These are known as 
“appropriation mechanisms.”71  First, firms can patent their innovation, which would 
allow them to exclude competitors from practicing or commercializing the technology.  
To the extent that the product incorporating the technology does not face close 
substitutes, the patentee will be able to raise the price of the product and profit from the 
innovation.  The innovator can also resort to trade secrecy and conceal the technology 
from its competitors altogether.  For example, if a firm is able to keep a cost-cutting 
technology secret and utilize it in its production process, it will acquire a cost advantage 
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67
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over its rivals and be able to undercut their prices.  This will allow the firm to capture 
market share from its competitors, especially if the product is homogenous or if the 
competing firms’ offerings are close substitutes.  Trade secrecy is hence another way for 
the firm to profit from its innovation.   
¶36  A firm may appropriate returns from its innovation even in the absence of patent 
protection and trade secrecy.  This related set of appropriation mechanisms generally falls 
under the rubric of first-mover advantages.  The first firm to come up with a new 
technology and commercialize it gains an advantage over its rivals.  First, even if the 
technology is not protected by trade secrecy (assuming it is a product innovation that is 
apparent from the appearance of the product itself, such as a hammer) or patent 
protection, it will still take rivals time and money to reverse-engineer the technology.  
The technology may be very difficult to reverse-engineer, perhaps because replication of 
the technology requires substantial tacit know-how that is not discernible from the 
product itself.  Even if the technology is not technically very difficult to reverse engineer, 
it may take rivals considerable time to do so, simply due to the laborious nature of the 
process.  The amount of time that rivals need to enter the market through imitation is 
called an “imitation lag.”72  The longer is this lag, the greater is the innovator’s first-
mover advantage.  The innovator will have more time to profit from supra-competitive 
pricing before rivals enter the market.   
¶37  Through a number of empirical studies, Professor Edwin Mansfield has confirmed 
the time-consuming and resource-intensive nature of imitation.
73
  In a survey published in 
1981, Mansfield and his co-authors found that the ratio of imitation costs to innovation 
costs was about 0.65, and the ratio of imitation time to innovation time was about 0.70.
74
  
In other words, it takes an imitator 70% of the time and 65% of the cost expended by the 
innovator to replicate the technology.  In fact, imitation costs were no smaller than 
innovation costs in one-seventh of the cases surveyed in their study.
75
  Imitation is by no 
means costless or instantaneous, as is sometimes assumed.  If it took an innovator four 
years to invent a new technology, the imitator on average would need almost three years 
to replicate it.  The innovator will have a three-year window to establish its product in the 
market and gain consumer acceptance.  The innovator will also be able to charge a higher 
price in the interim to recoup its R&D costs.   
¶38  This first-mover advantage can be enhanced by branding and product 
differentiation strategies.  These strategies will give the innovator greater customer 
loyalty and allow it to more effectively protect its market share after entry by rivals.  
More generally, sales and marketing efforts also constitute an appropriation mechanism.
76
  
The most intuitive and direct way to profit from one’s innovation is to engage in sales 
and marketing to boost product sales.  On the production side, learning curve advantages 
have been known to give the innovator an edge over its imitating rivals.  By virtue of its 
early start, the innovator will be ahead of its rivals on the learning curve, and may 
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 Sidney G. Winter, Appropriating the Gains from Innovation, in WHARTON ON MANAGING EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES 250–51 (George S. Day et al. eds., 2000). 
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 See Edwin Mansfield et al, Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907, 907–17 
(1981); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 173–80 (1986).  
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continue to possess technical and know-how advantages.
77
  These learning curve 
advantages will allow the innovator to produce technically superior products even after 
imitation has succeeded.  
¶39  The variety of appropriation mechanisms means that private returns to innovation 
are likely to substantially exceed private returns to patenting.
78
  This observation has been 
confirmed by a number of empirical studies.
79
  Using a variety of methodologies, such as 
estimating private value of patents from firms’ willingness to pay renewal fees for their 
patents, economists have tried to determine the private benefits of patent protection 
independent of the value of the underlying technology.  Their general conclusions are 
that: (1) the private values of patents are highly dispersed; (2) the distribution of values is 
highly skewed, with most value accounted for by the top-earning patents; and, (3) the 
average value of patents is much lower than the average R&D costs.
80
  While the last 
conclusion may cause concerns that the patent system generates inadequate innovation 
incentives and that innovators are systematically incurring losses from their R&D 
activities, the fact that innovation continues to be created in huge number suggests 
otherwise.   
¶40  In an efficient market, firms could not have been pursuing a loss-making activity 
for years without suffering severe consequences.  Therefore, the inescapable conclusion 
is that firms recover their R&D costs through other means.  Patent protection is but one 
of the many ways through which R&D investments are recouped.  Grilriches, Pakes and 
Hall found that the aggregate private value of patents amounts to roughly only 10% to 
15% of the total national expenditures of R&D.
81
  This led Landes and Posner to 
conclude that “incremental increases in patent protection are unlikely to influence 
inventive activity significantly and incremental reductions might actually enhance 
economic welfare.”82  Given that firms rely on a range of appropriation mechanisms to 
capture of the value of their innovations,
83
 the aggregate private benefits of innovation 
must be considered when determining optimal patent protection, and by extension, the 
optimal patent-antitrust rules.   
¶41  Private costs of innovation and patenting again could be different.  Strictly 
speaking, private costs of innovation refer to the R&D costs incurred to develop an 
innovation.  Private costs of patenting refer to the costs incurred by a firm to secure a 
patent.  However, it seems that the two terms are used interchangeably by economists and 
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lawyers alike.  When economists speak of and measure patent costs, they seem to have in 
mind the R&D costs, perhaps together with the patenting costs.
84
  For most patents, there 
are good reasons to believe that R&D costs dwarf patenting costs.
85
  The focus of our 
attention in the ensuing discussion will be R&D costs.   
¶42  How do the patent-antitrust rules fit into the picture?  How do the rules relate to all 
these parameters?  The conventional wisdom is that within the patent system, consumer 
welfare loss is traded for patentee reward.  In other words, private benefits of innovation 
are generated at the expense of external costs.  The relationship, however, is more 
complex than that.  Private benefits, in particular patentee reward, are related to both 
external costs and external benefits.  Returns from innovation are derived from multiple 
sources.  In addition to consumer welfare loss, these returns are also derived from the 
minimization of spillovers and the denial of follow-on innovation by rival innovators.  In 
other words, an increase in patentee reward may cause a loss of surplus by other firms 
and beneficiaries of spillovers.  The tradeoff is hence not just between patentee reward 
and consumer welfare loss.  It is more accurately characterized as one between patentee 
reward and net social benefits.
86
 
B. Determination of Patentee Reward 
1. A Costs-Based Approach to Patentee Reward 
¶43  From a social perspective, an innovation would be beneficial for society if its social 
benefits outweigh its social costs, or if it results in net social benefits.  Society would be 
better off with the innovation than without it.  In addition, society would like to maximize 
its net social benefits from each innovation so long as it is made.  The decision to pursue 
the innovation, however, lies not with society but with the innovator.  It is its private 
calculus of costs and benefits that determines whether an innovation is made.  An 
innovator does not care about the net social benefits of its creation. It is only concerned 
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benefits and the various components of net social benefits.  Increased returns from sales and marketing may 
reduce surplus for other firms.  However, this has nothing to do with the patent-antitrust interface. 
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with its profitability.  The alternative to innovation is to spend the funds on another 
investment opportunity.  A firm contemplating innovation is confronted with an array of 
investment options, such as building a new production plant to expand capacity, 
launching a marketing campaign to increase sales, improving its in-house IT system to 
improve its operational efficiency, or developing a cost-cutting technology that will allow 
it to produce its goods more cost-effectively.  The firm will choose to pursue innovation 
if it promises the highest rate of return, or if returns from innovation cover its direct R&D 
costs plus opportunity cost, which would be the returns that the firm can obtain from its 
next best investment option.  If the returns from innovation slightly exceed its R&D costs 
and opportunity cost, the firm will choose to develop the technology.  
¶44  The implication is that from the perspective of the optimization of patent protection 
and patent-antitrust rules, we would first like to determine the desirability of an 
innovation by weighing its social benefits against its social costs.  If the former exceeds 
the latter, society would benefit from the innovation.  Once it is determined that an 
innovation creates net social benefits, society would prefer to obtain it at the lowest 
possible costs.  Society would prefer to offer the innovator a reward just large enough to 
cover its private costs of innovation, which now include both direct R&D costs and 
opportunity cost.  Any reward greater than what is strictly necessary to obtain the 
innovation will be socially wasteful and will constitute a windfall to the innovator.  The 
task of maximizing social gains from an innovation while ensuring that innovation costs 
are covered can be achieved through a variety of means, such as adjusting the length of 
patent term, the scope of patent rights, or the amount of antitrust restrictions on patent 
exploitation.  Given that this Article is concerned with the patent-antitrust interface, it 
will focus on the last means.
87
 
¶45  In fact, if it was possible for the government to predict accurately ex ante the costs 
for developing every innovation that emerges in the economy, it could provide a lump-
sum prize to reward innovators.
88
  So long as the government can make a credible 
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commitment to paying the prize, or can be effectively prevented from reneging after the 
fact, this system would be superior to the patent system, which incurs a deadweight loss 
as a result of supra-competitive pricing.  As Professors Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer 
observed, “[t]he current patent system—which grants the patentee a monopoly for a 
limited number of years—is structured to minimize the government’s information 
requirement.”89  The problem is that no one, including the government, possesses perfect 
information and no one can accurately predict innovation costs in advance.  The patent 
system is our best option in light of this limitation.   
¶46  To circumvent this problem of imperfect information, the patent system eschews 
the task of estimating innovation costs ex ante altogether.  It simply makes no attempt to 
match patentee reward to innovation costs.
90
  What seems to have happened instead is 
that patentee reward is roughly calibrated to the social value of innovation.  For example, 
under the principle of pioneering patents, groundbreaking innovations that open up a new 
field of research or commercial development, which obviously create greater social 
value, are entitled to broader protection than less significant innovations.
91
  Under the 
doctrine of reverse equivalents, a technological improvement may escape literal 
infringement if it represents a substantial progress from existing art.
92
  Even the basic 
patent doctrine of nonobviousness seems to reflect the value of the innovation as 
indicated by its improvement from prior art.
93
  The extent of improvement from prior art 
is one indication of the social value of an innovation; the greater the social value, the 
more expansive the scope of protection.  As Scotchmer noted, “[g]iven that the length 
and breadth of patent protection cannot depend on the expected costs of an R&D project, 
the only way to ensure that firms undertake every research project that is efficient is to let 
the firms collect as revenue all the social value they create.”94  Given that the basic 
parameters of patent protection, such as patent length and scope of patent rights, are set 
ex ante, this may be the only feasible solution to the problem of imperfect information 
within the patent system.
95
 
 
89
 Id.  
90
 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 300. Scotchmer, supra note 57, at 38.  Scotchmer corroborates 
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2. Critique of an Innovation Value-Based Approach 
¶47  The focus of our inquiry is not the patent system as such, but how antitrust law may 
adjust patentee reward by tightening or relaxing restrictions on patent exploitation.
96
  The 
question is whether the antitrust courts use private costs or social value of innovation as 
the basis of their decisions.  At first glance, it seems to be the latter.  The prevailing 
judicial approach seems to be that so long as a patent exploitation practice does not 
exceed the permissible scope of patent rights granted by the statute, it would generally be 
upheld.
97
  If social optimality requires patentee reward to be benchmarked against 
innovation costs instead of social value, and the patent system is prevented from doing so 
because of imperfect information ex ante, the crux of our inquiry then becomes whether 
the antitrust courts should perpetuate the suboptimal decision-making of the patent 
system or embrace a different standard instead.   
¶48  Two arguments can be made in defense of using social value of innovation as a 
benchmark under the patent-antitrust rules.  The first argument is the familiar one of 
imperfect information.  Just as the patent system is unable to determine innovation costs 
ex ante, the antitrust courts will be equally incapable of doing so ex post.  Therefore, 
using social value of innovation as a benchmark is our only feasible solution.  While this 
imperfect information argument may apply to the patent system,
98
 it is less persuasive in 
the antitrust context.
99
  Antitrust decisions are made in ex post proceedings that take place 
after the innovation has been created and exploited.  Innovation costs can be ascertained 
with a reasonable degree of accuracy in ex post judicial proceedings.
100
  Once an 
innovation has been completed, the R&D costs are ascertainable from the firm’s internal 
accounting documents.  Moreover, the antitrust courts have the capability to handle 
complex calculations.  They regularly do so with the sophisticated statistical and 
econometric analyses presented in market definition and quantification of consumer 
harm.  Therefore, the information problem is considerably more surmountable ex post in 
an antitrust proceeding than ex ante under the patent system.   
¶49  In comparison, an accurate assessment of social benefits will be beset with 
tremendous difficulty.  The value of an innovation to a firm cannot be determined 
independent of the market structure in which it operates.  The amount of profit a firm can 
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appropriation.  Therefore, the discussion that follows will refer to patentee reward, ignoring the impact of 
other private benefits of innovation for the time being.   
97
 See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); see also CSU v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2000).  
98
 In fact, this argument is not entirely apt even when applied to patent law itself.  Although the general 
parameters of patent protection are set by the statute ex ante, the courts can and do make adjustments to the 
scope of protection and rights ex post.  This is the essence of what Burk and Lemley call “policy levers” in 
patent law.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 29, at 1638-67.  Even the standard of patentability is adjusted ex 
post by the courts.  Merges has argued that the doctrine of nonobviousness should be adjusted ex post to 
take into account the R&D costs of innovation.  Merges, supra note 93, at 34–54.  
99
 A related, but different, objection is that even if private costs of innovation could be accurately 
calculated ex post, what matters to the decision to invest in an innovation is not these costs which are 
ascertained ex post, but the expected costs of innovation arrived at by the firm ex ante.  This argument will 
be addressed subsequently.  
100
 Merges, supra note 93, at 55.   
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 3  
 
 408
make from an innovation depends on the existence of substitutes and competitors and 
entry barriers, among other things.  For example, in Baumol’s model of contestable, 
oligopolistic markets involving routinized innovation, the value of innovation is said to 
be equal to its marginal cost of production plus a depreciation charge that will allow the 
firms to recover their R&D outlays.
101
  In addition to private benefits, social benefits of 
an innovation include the benefits from follow-on innovations made possible by the 
initial innovation.  The full benefits of cumulative innovation will be difficult to ascertain 
with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  Social benefits become practically impossible to 
measure accurately once one incorporates the spillover effects.  Therefore, setting 
patentee reward against the social value of innovation is unlikely to be feasible. 
¶50  This leads one to wonder how the existing patent system undertakes this complex 
exercise.  The answer is that it does not.  While the ostensible basis for patentee reward is 
social value of innovation, the patent system makes only limited effort to adjust the scope 
of patent protection to the social value of an innovation.  As mentioned previously, some 
patent doctrines offer greater protection to groundbreaking innovations.  This is in some 
way recognition of the importance of an innovation.  The focus under these doctrines, 
however, is not the innovation’s social value, but its technical merit.  The standard is 
usually by how much the innovation improves upon the prior art.  While technically 
meritorious innovations may have a greater chance of being social valuable, this 
correlation is by no means certain.  One can imagine a highly sophisticated egg-cracking 
device that leaves no mess behind.  It may be a substantial improvement from existing 
egg-cracking technology, but its social value is likely to be limited.   
¶51  The lack of a meaningful attempt by the patent system to ascertain the social value 
of an innovation leaves open a distinct possibility that patentee reward may exceed its 
social value.  This would amount to overcompensation of the innovators and is 
indefensible from a social welfare perspective.  This is a further reason why antitrust 
cannot rely on the scope of patent rights as a basis for deciding patent-antitrust cases.  
The use of social value as a benchmark is beset with problems.  The lack of a real attempt 
by patent law to match the scope of protection to social value means that scope of patent 
rights is a highly inaccurate benchmark for antitrust cases.  Deciding patent-antitrust 
cases with a view to preserving patentee reward will unlikely lead to socially optimal 
outcome.   
¶52  The second argument, which more generally applies to both the patent-antitrust 
rules and the patent system, is that an innovator should be allowed to reap the full 
benefits of her innovation.  That is, the innovator should enjoy the benefits of what she 
creates.  This argument has great intuitive appeal.  What can be more fair than reaping the 
full value of one’s own labor?  This argument also resonates with the Lockean labor 
theory of property.
102
  Unfortunately, Lockean theory only applies to physical property 
and there is no strong theoretical justification for allowing intellectual property owners to 
appropriate the full value of their creations.  Intellectual property law generally, and 
patent law in particular, have always been justified on utilitarian grounds.
103
  Intellectual 
property protection is offered to generate incentives, not to protect the value of one’s 
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102
 JOHN LOCKE, LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 314–15 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967). 
103
 Burk & Lemley, supra note 29, at 1580. 
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creation.
104
  This is clear from the language of the Constitution.
105
  Numerous 
commentators have endorsed this incentive theory for patent protection.  Professor 
Edmund Kitch argues that “a patent should not be granted for an innovation unless the 
innovation would have been unlikely to have been developed absent protection of a 
patent.”106  Professor Robert Merges expresses a similar view that “[t]he conventional 
ideal standard of patentability is that patents should only be awarded to those inventions 
that would not have been made without the availability of the patent.”107  Burk and 
Lemley observe that “[t]o a greater extent than any other area of intellectual property, 
courts and commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of patent law is utilitarian: 
We grant patents in order to encourage invention.”108  The notion that patentee reward 
should reflect the social value of an innovation because an innovator should gain the full 
value of its creation can only be justified by a just desert or reward theory of patent law, 
which has been roundly rejected.
109
  If the goal of patent law is genuinely utilitarian, 
patentee reward must be calibrated to the private costs of innovation.   
¶53  The idea that patentee reward should only aim to cover the private costs of 
innovation has also received considerable support.  With respect to the determination of 
optimal patentee reward, Boldrin and Levine note that “producers must be compensated 
for their costs, thereby providing them with the economic incentive of doing what they 
are best at doing.  But they do not need to be compensated more than this.”110  Professor 
Daniel Crane observes that “statutory innovation, legal doctrine, and judicial, executive, 
and administrative practice have begun to cast intellectual property as a right to recover 
the risk-adjusted costs of invention but not necessarily to exclude others from the 
invention,”111 and that “[t]he optimal solution is the inclusion of those rights that grant 
just enough reward to induce the incentive or creative activity at the lowest social cost 
possible.”112  Merges’ proposed reformulation of the doctrine of nonobviousness—which 
determines the breadth of patent rights—based on R&D cost consideration is also an 
implicit recognition that patentee reward should be concerned with recoupment of 
costs.
113
  In light of the overwhelming consensus on the utilitarian justification of the 
patent system, and widespread recognition that patentee reward should only aim to cover 
private costs of innovation, it is surprising that most patent-antitrust cases focus on the 
preservation of the scope of patent rights and make no attempt to consider innovation 
costs.   
 
104
 Crane, supra note 1, at 254 (“Intellectual property is incrementally moving away from the 
conventional right of the landowner to fence out trespassers and toward a right to collect royalties from 
constructive licensees.”); see also Bessen & Meurer, supra note 67, at 33–34 (noting doctrinal differences 
between patent rights and real property rights). 
105
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¶54  Setting patentee reward higher than private costs of innovation not only 
overcompensates the innovators,
114
 but it also attracts rent-seeking behavior.
115
  Potential 
innovators will expend considerable costs to obtain patent protection, as demonstrated by 
patent races.  Landes and Posner believe that the high incidence of failed drug 
development projects is evidence of rent-seeking behavior by the large pharmaceutical 
firms.
116
  The existence of substantial economic rent from patent protection has been 
confirmed by Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer.  Economic rents are 
supernormal or excess profits earned by patentees above the level of competitive returns.  
They found that in 1999, the pharmaceuticals and chemicals industries earned $15.2 
billion and other industries earned about $3.2 billion in patent rents in 1992 dollars.
117
  
They further found that the annual rent per patent in the pharmaceuticals and chemicals 
industries in 1999 was about $531,000, and that for other industries roughly $39,000 per 
patent.
118
   
¶55  The disproportionately high patent rent for the pharmaceuticals and chemicals 
industries lends support to Landes and Posner’s intuition that at least some of the failed 
R&D projects in the pharmaceuticals industry constitute rent-seeking behavior.  This is 
further confirmed by Professor F.M. Scherer’s observation that pharmaceutical firms tend 
to increase their R&D expenditure following a rise in revenue.  Their R&D expenditure 
seems not to be determined by the number of promising technological opportunities, but 
by the amount of cash that they have to spare.  He argued that a competitive rent-seeking 
model best describes the R&D agenda of these firms.
119
  Rent-seeking behavior is 
particularly harmful in a differentiated market with competing patented products, which 
characterizes many pharmaceutical markets.
120
  When there are numerous firms 
competing for economic rent, and so long as competition does not completely eliminate 
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 This windfall problem would be alleviated if we could somehow internalize all the social costs of 
patent protection so that the innovator will take into both the social benefits and costs of its innovation 
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this rent, the rival oligopolists will produce too many similar items and this over-
production will offset much of the social surplus from innovation. 
C. A Closer Look at the Private Costs of Innovation 
1. Unrecoverable Sunk Costs vs. Fixed Costs 
¶56  A number of issues pertaining to R&D costs remain to be addressed.  The first one 
is whether R&D costs are sunk costs that should be disregarded altogether in patent-
antitrust cases or whether they are fixed costs of production that need to be recouped in 
order to preserve dynamic efficiency.  Boldrin and Levine have argued that in a 
competitive market, no extra legal protection is needed to allow a firm to recover its 
R&D costs.  They characterize R&D costs as the costs for producing the first unit, 
asserting that “[s]ince only ideas embodied in people or products matter, the cost of 
creation is the cost of producing the first unit.  Such a ‘sunk cost’ is very ordinary in 
economics, and poses no particular threat to perfect competition.”121  Baumol agrees that 
if R&D costs were indeed sunk, the nonrivalrous nature of the consumption of innovation 
means that any license fee that would prevent some users from adopting the technology 
would be inefficient.
122
  This, however, is where their agreement ends.  According to 
Baumol, while the R&D costs for serendipitous innovation, which he understands to be a 
one-time innovation that arises more out of luck than persistent effort, are sunk, the R&D 
costs for what he calls routinized innovation are recurrent and should be taken into 
account when determining the optimal patentee reward.
123
   
¶57  The better view is that R&D costs need to be recouped.  First and foremost, the 
argument that sunk costs can be disregarded ignores the dynamic efficiency aspect of the 
problem.  Patent protection affects not only the present innovator, but also potential 
innovators who will be deterred from pursuing R&D if they knew that they would be 
denied recovery of their R&D costs.  Second, even Boldrin and Levine admit that there 
are situations in which ordinary competitive rent will be insufficient to induce innovative 
activity.
124
  They believe that the subset of innovations to which this applies is small. 
There are reasons, however, to believe that they may have underestimated the size of the 
subset.  Third, one may argue that patentee reward should aim to permit recoupment of 
the R&D costs of even serendipitous innovation.  This is not to suggest that they are 
likely to be in the same magnitude as the costs of routinized innovation, yet it remains 
true that serendipitous innovation often emerges in the context of a routinized innovation 
project.
125
  A research team may have accidentally discovered a chemical that turns out to 
be highly valuable.
126
  The team probably has incurred considerable costs to put itself in a 
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position to make the accidental discovery.  At least part of these costs should be 
considered when determining the size of patentee reward.   
¶58  Finally, if patentee reward is to be based on innovation costs, and yet R&D costs 
are deemed to be sunk and unrecoverable, as argued by Boldrin and Levine, the necessary 
implication would be the abolition of the patent system, which is the central thesis of 
their book Against Intellectual Property.  This is probably a step too far.  What this 
Article advocates is only a return to the utilitarian roots of the patent system and the use 
of innovation costs as a reference point for the patent-antitrust rules when delineating the 
permissible scope of patent exploitation.   
2. Taking Risks of Innovation into Account 
¶59  It is often argued that patentee reward needs to take into account the risks of 
innovation. Innovation is a risky venture.  Many R&D projects fail to produce any useful 
product for the firm while incurring considerable costs.  Prime examples are failed drug 
development projects.
127
  The argument that patentee reward needs to take risks into 
account usually comes in two forms: first, that the risk of a particular project needs to be 
reflected in its reward so that expected returns, and not actual returns, from the project 
are sufficient to cover its costs, and second, that patentee reward needs to allow firms to 
cover the costs incurred in both successful and failed projects.  If firms only make a 
competitive return from successful projects while incurring wasted R&D costs from 
failed projects, firms would be running at a loss and innovation would be deterred.   
¶60  These arguments are certainly valid.  There is no denying that the risks of 
innovation must be considered when setting optimal patentee protection.  However, it 
cannot be true that patentee reward must both reflect the risks of individual projects and 
cover the wasted R&D costs from failed projects.  Doing so would amount to an 
insurance against all failures in R&D, which would surely lead firms to take on excess 
R&D risks and encourage the kind of rent-seeking behavior identified by Landes, Posner, 
and Scherer.  As valuable as innovation is to society, society cannot provide a safety net 
for all failed R&D projects.  Firms must bear the consequences of their failures in order 
for the R&D decision-making process to remain efficient, at least from a private 
perspective.
128
  A better approach to incorporating risks of innovation is to adjust the 
patentee reward by the ex ante estimation of success rate.  If an R&D project was 
estimated to have a 50% success rate prior to its commencement, and private costs of 
innovation turn out to be $1 million, the patentee reward should be raised to $2 million to 
ensure that the innovator’s ex ante risks are reflected.129   
 
127
 Studies of pharmaceutical R&D estimate that if one were to screen 5,000 to 10,000 chemical 
compounds for possible therapeutic value, roughly 250 of them will show sufficient promise for further 
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the drugs that are clinically tested end up in failure.  JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 6, at 42.  For more 
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Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: 
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CHEE-RUEY HSIEH EDS., 2007). 
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¶61  A caveat is in order.  It is easy to overstate the extent of failure in innovation.  
Projects that do not produce readily commercializable products may generate useful 
knowledge that turns out to be valuable in subsequent projects.  Unintended outcome or 
products emerge from R&D projects regularly.  If the risks of failure are to be reflected in 
patentee reward, the unexpected or incidental benefits of these projects should be counted 
as well.  These benefits should be deducted from the expected patentee reward. 
D. A Proposed Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface 
¶62  So what lessons does the foregoing discussion hold for resolving the patent-
antitrust conflict?  An innovation would be beneficial to society if its social benefits 
outweigh its social costs.  If the contrary were true, society would be better off without 
the innovation.  This may suggest that the antitrust courts should attempt to determine the 
social desirability of innovation.  If an innovation fails to create social benefits, the court 
should try to limit the scope of patent exploitation to such an extent that private benefits 
of innovation are insufficient to cover its private costs.  This would signal to future 
innovators the need to undertake a careful evaluation of the net social benefits of their 
R&D projects.  The antitrust courts would help to restore the proper function of the patent 
system and to ensure that only net socially beneficial innovations are pursued.   
¶63  While that may be theoretically sound, it would be immensely difficult in practice 
for the antitrust courts to arrive at a confident estimation of the social benefits of an 
innovation, even if the exercise is done after the fact.  The difficulty with ascertaining 
social benefits has been alluded to earlier.  Nascent technology compounds this difficulty.  
Possible uses of the technology may not have been discovered at the time of the suit.  
Therefore, even if the courts were able to derive accurate estimations of the total social 
benefits and costs of an innovation at the time of the suit, they would still fail the exercise 
by excluding possible future costs and, more importantly, benefits.  If the courts 
systematically underestimate the social benefits of nascent technologies, litigants 
challenging a patent exploitation practice under antitrust law will be induced to bring 
suits early in the life of a technology.   
¶64  Moreover, to allow the antitrust courts to determine the social desirability of an 
innovation and to roll back the incentives provided by the patent system would amount to 
a usurpation of the patent system.  Even if the courts were able to come to a correct 
estimation in every case, it would introduce substantial uncertainty to corporate business 
planning.  A firm would stand to suffer great loss if it turned out to have been wrong 
about the social costs and benefits of its innovation.  The risks of innovation would be 
magnified.  And if the courts were to make mistakes in their judgment, which they are 
bound to do, the costs of false positives would be enormous.  In light of these serious 
detriments of overreaching, the antitrust courts should assume innovations that have been 
created as socially desirable and focus on calibrating patentee reward that would allow 
the innovator to recover its innovation costs while maximizing net social benefits.   
¶65  In patent-antitrust cases, antitrust law should strive to maximize net social benefits 
while ensuring that private benefits of innovation cover innovation costs.
130
  One way to 
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think of this task is as a problem of constrained maximization.  The entity to be 
maximized is net social benefits of an innovation, subject to the constraint that private 
benefits exceed innovation costs.  This approach merely represents a return to the 
utilitarian roots of the patent system, which require patentee reward to be benchmarked 
against innovation costs.  The goal of patent protection is to provide innovation 
incentives by ensuring that innovation costs are recovered.  Since innovation costs 
include both direct R&D costs and the opportunity cost of innovation, if patentee reward 
slightly exceeds those costs, innovators should have sufficient incentives to innovate.  
Hence the purpose of the constraint is to ensure that socially beneficial innovations 
continue to be created.   
¶66  Subject to the constraint that innovation costs are covered, the antitrust courts 
should attempt to maximize net social benefits by reducing social costs and raising social 
benefits.
131
  Patentee reward should be traded off for increase in net social benefits.  To 
the extent that patentee reward substantially exceeds innovation costs on a systemic basis, 
there will be room for antitrust to trade patentee reward for greater social benefits without 
undermining innovation incentives.  This is where the maximization comes into the 
picture.  The handsome patent rents earned in some industries suggest that this is a 
realistic prospect.  The discussion thus far has focused on patentee reward because it is 
the kind of private benefit that is most directly affected by the patent-antitrust rules.  It is 
important to recall the empirical evidence that the private benefits of innovation 
significantly exceed patentee reward.  This is because of the range of appropriation 
mechanisms, such as first mover advantage and sales and marketing, at an innovator’s 
disposal.  In order to ensure that innovators are not overcompensated, the constraint 
under the constrained maximization approach should be reformulated to refer to private 
benefits as opposed to patentee reward.  As long as the various kinds of private benefits 
in aggregate cover innovation costs, innovation incentives will be preserved.   
¶67  Theoretically, the constrained maximization approach could work in both 
directions.  It could either reduce or augment private benefits of innovation by adjusting 
the scope of patent exploitation.  The constraint prong only requires private benefits of 
innovation to cover innovation costs; adjustments to patentee reward are not confined to 
downward ones.  If innovation costs are found to have exceeded aggregate private 
 
the impact is usually more indirect and difficult to predict.  Therefore, this Article will assume that the 
principal focus of the courts on the private benefit side of the trade-off is patentee reward, while largely 
taking the remaining private benefits as given.   
131
 In a way, this is similar to Kaplow’s model, in which he recognizes the need simultaneously to solve 
the questions of the optimal scope of the patent-antitrust doctrine and the patent life.  See Kaplow, supra 
note 1, at 1839–42.  When Kaplow poses the question of the optimal patent life, what he seeks to answer is 
the optimal scope of patent protection.  Under the constrained maximization approach, the optimal scope of 
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amount of protection which results in a patentee reward slightly exceeding innovation costs minus returns 
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must be done in every case.   
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benefits, the innovator could conceivably request the court to relax the patent-antitrust 
rules to allow it to recover innovation costs.  There may even be concerns that patentees 
with failed R&D projects may try to recoup its losses through opportunistic use of 
antitrust suits.   
¶68  When evaluating such a claim by the innovator, the courts should be mindful that 
private benefits are not measured only up to the time of suit, but over the lifetime of the 
technology.  The court should only relax the scope of patent exploitation under the 
constrained maximization approach if there is convincing evidence that the innovator will 
not break even eventually.  Moreover, while this may be a theoretical concern, it is 
unlikely to be a serious one in reality.  Past experience shows that patents that raise 
significant antitrust issues are likely to be highly valuable.  Private benefits for these 
innovations are likely to be high and to exceed their innovation costs.  Meanwhile, 
patents for failed innovations are likely to be of low commercial value and are unlikely to 
raise antitrust concerns.  Therefore, the opportunistic use of antitrust suits to make up for 
loss-making R&D projects should not be a matter of grave concern.   
¶69  One advantage of the constrained maximization approach is that it avoids the pitfall 
of the prevalent judicial approach that tends to examine a patent exploitation practice in 
isolation.  What the courts tend to do is to decide whether a particular exploitation 
practice is within the scope of patent rights, however the rights are defined.  It does not 
matter how else the patentee has chosen to exploit is patent.  A patentee may have 
extended the term of royalty payment beyond the patent term, which was deemed illegal 
by the Supreme Court in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
132
 but at the same time may have refrained 
from engaging in price fixing with its licensee-competitor under the well-known but 
much-maligned GE exception.
133
  It may have exceeded the permissible scope with one 
exploitation practice, but may have stayed clear of the limit with respect to another 
practice.  In the aggregate, the patentee may have reaped no more benefits than that 
which is necessary to recover its innovation costs.  Under the current judicial approach, 
the extension of royalty payment beyond the patent term is deemed illegal, regardless of 
the totality of circumstances.  This approach overlooks the fact that the size of the 
patentee reward is not determined by one patent exploitation practice, but by the overall 
mix of exploitation practices employed by a patentee.  As Crane observed, the legality of 
a patent exploitation practice must be examined in light of the “bundle of rights” that a 
patentee has chosen to exercise.
134
  By taking a holistic look at the social calculus, the 
constrained maximization approach avoids this pitfall.   
¶70  The holistic analysis required by the constrained maximization approach will need 
to be undertaken within a Rule of Reason framework.  It will be difficult to state a priori 
whether a particular patent exploitation practice is pro-competitive or not.  This should be 
unproblematic because few commentators and courts advocate a per se approach to the 
patent-antitrust interface.  What may be unfamiliar to some within the antitrust circle is 
the idea that the legality of one practice depends on the range of exploitation practices 
adopted by the patentee.  This unfamiliarity, or perhaps even unease, is in some ways 
understandable because in few other areas of antitrust does the legality of one conduct 
depend on the firm’s market behavior as a whole.  This is almost the same as saying that 
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resale price maintenance is illegal because the firm has pursued predatory pricing in the 
relevant market, or perhaps even a different market.  However, this interdependence is 
the necessary consequence of the fact that the resolution of patent-antitrust issues is 
essentially an optimization process.  This is true in both Kaplow’s model and the 
constrained maximization approach proposed in this Article.  Optimization is necessary 
because calibration of the appropriate scope of the patent-antitrust rules requires the 
ascertainment of the optimal tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiencies.  This 
optimization rationale does not exist in other areas of antitrust law.  Antitrust does not 
strive to discover the optimal tradeoff between price and output for firms.  Nor does it 
attempt to strike a balance between producer and consumer surplus. 
III. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
A. A Simplification of the Constrained Maximized Approach 
¶71  While a full-fledged constrained maximization approach would be the most 
theoretically precise and comprehensive, it is unlikely that the courts would be prepared 
equipped to consider such a wide range of interrelated and difficult-to-quantify factors in 
their decision.  Therefore, it is worth simplifying the analytical framework and focus on 
the most important components to improve the administrability of the approach.   
¶72  The external benefits of innovation include the direct benefits of a new technology 
for society, the spillover effects, and the possibility of follow-on innovation built upon 
this technology.
135
  The direct social benefits of an innovation are a key component of net 
social benefits and should clearly be incorporated in the framework.  These benefits 
depend on two factors: the inherent technical contribution of the innovation in satisfying 
a previously unmet consumer demand and the availability of the technology.  The former 
is unlikely to be affected, at least not directly, by the patent-antitrust rules.
136
  The latter 
will be highly sensitive to the patent-antitrust rules.  Stricter patent-antitrust rules will 
improve the availability of the technology to consumers, which implies that it is likely to 
be sold at a price closer to the competitive level.   
¶73  The treatment of spillover benefits is more difficult.  While spillover effects can be 
substantial, restricting patent protection in order to increase them and facilitate imitation 
would be a direct affront to the patent system.  The quintessential patent right is the right 
to exclude.  Imitation can only be facilitated and spillovers augmented if this right is 
dramatically curtailed.  While consumers would no doubt be better off if more firms 
could commercialize the technology and offer the product at lower prices, which is a 
tradeoff that is best left to the patent system to make.   
 
135
 The social benefits of innovation, of course, consist of both external and private benefits.  Similarly, 
social costs of innovation consist of both external and private costs of innovation.  The private benefits and 
costs of innovation, however, need not be reconsidered here because under the constrained maximization 
approach, private benefits are meant to be just sufficient to cover private costs. They are roughly 
equivalent. We can thus take them both out of the consideration and focus on external benefits and costs.  
136
 It is conceivable that patent-antitrust rules may have such a direct and significant impact on patentee 
reward, and assuming that patentee reward accounts for a large proportion of the private benefits of 
innovation, that firms will make substantial adjustments to their R&D budgets accordingly.  If we further 
assume that the significant changes in R&D investments will affect the technical merits of innovation, then 
the patent-antitrust rules may have indirect impact on the inherent technical contribution of an innovation.  
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¶74  The situation is different for cumulative innovation.  Here, the improver does not 
simply replicate the innovator’s technology and undercut its profit margin.  The improver 
actually builds on the technology and creates new technologies or products out of it.  
Given the substantial benefits of cumulative innovation, it should be retained in the 
constrained maximization exercise.   
¶75  As for the external costs of innovation, they include consumer welfare loss from 
supra-competitive pricing and the costs of creative destruction.  The costs of creative 
destruction should be left out.  While it is true that they impose real costs on society, they 
seem to be an inevitable price to pay for technological progress.  Assuming that these 
costs were internalized by a monopolist producer in a market, which chooses not to 
produce a new product because of the potential cannibalization of its revenue from 
existing products, few would believe that this is a desirable state of affairs.
137
  This is 
what Kenneth Arrow has described as the replacement effect, and is the main reason why, 
according to him, competition is more conducive to innovation than monopoly.
138
  By 
incorporating the costs of creative destruction in the analysis, we may inadvertently slow 
down competition in innovation.   
¶76  Consumer welfare loss should be the main focus of the constrained maximization 
approach, however simplified.  After all, consumer welfare is the main policy concern of 
antitrust law.  Pared down to a more manageable set of variables, a simplified constrained 
maximization should focus on maximizing net social benefits with due focus on 
consumer welfare loss, the direct social benefits of innovation, and the benefits of 
cumulative innovation. 
B. A Further Simplification of the Approach 
¶77  Even with the proposed simplification, the antitrust courts may still feel uneasy 
about the suggested approach.  The courts may feel ill-equipped to arrive at estimates of 
the direct social benefits of innovation or the benefits of cumulative innovation.  The 
courts may feel uncomfortable with the idea of a direct trade-off between patentee reward 
and the net social benefits of innovation.  The courts may further feel unable to arrive at 
an accurate estimate of the private costs of innovation, which include both R&D costs 
and opportunity costs.  Admittedly, the quantitative terms in which the constrained 
maximization approach has been formulated thus far may be so far removed from the 
structure of conventional legal doctrines that the courts may hesitate to adopt it.   
¶78  This concern can be addressed if the constrained maximization approach were 
reformulated in qualitative terms instead.  The insights from the approach can be distilled 
into a number of qualitative guidelines.  For example, should the various private benefits 
of innovation be too difficult to quantify, the courts can reinterpret the inquiry as how 
important patentee reward is to this innovator’s ability to recoup its innovation costs.  If it 
is found that patentee reward is not particularly important to an innovator, the courts will 
have greater leeway to minimize consumer harm and facilitate cumulative innovation.  
 
137
 Frederic M. Scherer, Technological Innovation and Monopolization 42 (Am. Antitrust Inst. Working 
Paper No. 05-07, 2005) at 18–34 (arguing that AT&T withheld certain important innovations for fear of 
cannibalization effect). 
138
 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962). 
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Similarly, the courts can qualitatively determine in which industries and under what 
circumstances cumulative innovation is likely to be especially beneficial to society.  
Fortunately, empirical studies by economists have demonstrated trends by innovation-
type and industry with respect to reliance on patent protection for innovation incentives, 
importance of cumulative innovation, and other inquiries that will prove useful to the 
courts in applying the constrained maximization approach.   
¶79  What follows is a host of guidelines to help the courts apply the insights from the 
constrained maximization approach.  These guidelines focus on the nature, breadth, 
depth, and source of the technology; the relationship between the technology and the final 
product; the relationship between the technology and other related technologies; and the 
industrial environment in which the technology is created.  It should be clear that after 
being reduced to these qualitative guidelines, the approach loses considerable precision.  
Nonetheless, these guidelines should provide the courts with some helpful guidance on 
how to apply an appropriate degree of scrutiny to verify innovation incentive arguments. 
1. Types of Innovation 
¶80  Economists have classified technologies along a number of different dimensions: 
incremental innovation vs. radical innovation; general-purpose technology vs. specialized 
technology; serendipitous innovation vs. routinized innovation; and, product innovation 
vs. process innovation.  These classifications focus on the different attributes of a 
technology.  As it turns out, these classifications provide helpful guidance on the 
qualitative application of the constrained maximization approach. 
i) Product Innovation vs. Process Innovation 
¶81  The distinction of product vs. process innovation pertains to the nature of the 
technology.  A product innovation results in a new product that substantially improves on 
existing products, drawing new demand from consumers.  A process innovation improves 
the production process of an existing product.  Baumol defines a product innovation as 
“one that shifts the demand curve for the affected final product to the right, while a 
process innovation is one that shifts the pertinent cost curves downward.”139  The most 
readily measurable benefit of a process innovation is the reduction of production costs.  
The social benefit of product innovation is reflected by the additional amount that 
consumers are willing to pay for the new product.  Economists have repeatedly found that 
product and process innovations exhibit varying degrees of dependence on patent 
protection as an appropriation mechanism.  Specifically, it has been shown in a number 
of empirical studies that patent protection is a more important method of protecting 
product innovation than it is for process innovation.  In one of the most exhaustive 
studies on the relative importance of different appropriation mechanisms, then-Professor 
Richard Levin and his co-authors (the “Yale survey”) discovered that patents were 
generally rated as the least effective appropriation mechanism for process innovations, 
and that lead time, learning curve advantages, and secrecy were all deemed to be more 
effective by R&D managers of major corporations.
140
  As for product innovations, patents 
 
139
 BAUMOL, supra note 6, at 154.  
140
 Levin et. al., supra note 46, at 794–95.  This is corroborated by a recent example.  The March 7, 2011 
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were more effective than secrecy as an appropriation mechanism, but were substantially 
less so than lead time, learning curve advantages, and sales efforts.
141
  80% of the 
sampled businesses rated sales and service effort, as an appropriation mechanism, at 5.0 
out of a 7-point effectiveness scale.  Only 20% of the sampled businesses gave patents 
the same effectiveness rating.
142
   
¶82  These results have been corroborated by subsequent studies.  In a 2000 update of 
the Yale survey, Professor Wesley Cohen and his co-authors (the “Carnegie-Mellon 
survey”) reached largely similar results as those obtained in the Yale survey.143  
Revealingly, the Carnegie-Mellon survey found that direct profit is no longer the 
predominant motive for patenting.  The prevention of rivals from patenting related 
inventions, the use of patents in negotiations, and the preemption of future infringement 
suits are now more important motivations for doing so.
144
  Industry perceptions of the 
relative effectiveness of patents as a means of protecting product and process innovations 
have manifested themselves in patenting behavior.  It has been estimated that large 
European firms applied for patents on only 36% of product innovations and 25% of 
process innovations.
145
   
¶83  If the courts are able to arrive at fairly reliable estimations of the weight of patentee 
reward in the aggregate private benefits of innovation, they would be able to determine 
by how much patentee reward can be adjusted without undermining innovation 
incentives.  However, in the likely event that this proves elusive, the courts can determine 
the relative importance of patentee reward as an appropriation mechanism based on the 
type of innovation at issue.  If the case involves a process innovation, the court can be 
less concerned that reducing patentee reward would undermine innovation incentives.  If 
the court is confronted with a product innovation, as seems more frequently to be the case 
from a quick survey of the leading patent-antitrust cases, it will need to proceed more 
cautiously.
146
 
ii) Incremental Innovation vs. Radical Innovation 
¶84  The distinction between incremental and radical innovations reflects the depth of 
the impact of the innovation.  An innovation that has a deep impact on future 
 
edition of The Economist contains an article about recent advancement in the use of carbon fiber materials 
in automobiles.  See Charles Babbage, A high-fibre diet, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE, Mar. 7, 2011, available 
at http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/03/carbon-fibre_composites&fsrc=nwl.  The article 
describes in detail the innovation in the manufacturing process that has allowed McLaren to mass-produce 
sports cars that are much lighter and more maneuverable than their peers.  This technology may 
revolutionize how sports cars are made.  Even McLaren believed that its competitors could imitate the 
production technique from the knowledge they can glean from the article, it would be unlikely that it would 
have disclosed its process innovation in such detail to the reporter.   
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 Id. at 795.  
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 Id. at 796. 
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ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 7552 (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.  
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survey, secrecy has become the most important appropriation mechanism even for product innovations.  
Cohen et. al., supra note 143, at 3.  
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technological development and society in general would be considered a radical 
innovation.  Otherwise, it would be characterized as an incremental innovation.  
Examples of radical innovation include the steam engine, penicillin, the airplane, and the 
Cohen-Boyer patents on recombinant DNA technology that have essentially opened the 
field of genetic engineering.  Needless to say, most innovations are incremental.  
However, the dichotomy between the two may not be as clear-cut as it would initially 
seem.  The depth of the impact of an innovation most likely varies along a spectrum.  
Moreover, what seems like a radical innovation often consists of a number of incremental 
innovations.
147
  A prime example is the steam engine, which has been said to consist of 
numerous technical innovations by various inventors prior to James Watt, such as 
Thomas Newcomen, who first created a functional steam engine in 1712.
148
   
¶85  It should be obvious that radical innovations redound substantially greater social 
benefits on society, both in terms of direct benefits and the possibility of follow-on 
innovation.  Without attempting to quantify the precise magnitude of the direct benefits, 
the courts should be able to conclude that a patent exploitation practice that restricts 
consumer access to a radical innovation will inflict considerable welfare loss on society.  
Similarly, a patent exploitation practice that limits other innovators’ access to the 
technology for possible follow-on innovations will deny society the substantial benefits 
of improved utilization of the radical innovation.  This is especially significant from a 
social welfare perspective because many radical innovations require subsequent 
incremental ones to be successfully commercialized.
149
   
¶86  The obvious objection is that by facilitating follow-on innovation and 
commercialization by other innovators, the courts will undermine the incentives of the 
original innovator to do the same.  This is reminiscent of Kitch’s prospect theory on 
patent protection, the key underlying assumption of which is that the original innovator 
possesses the best capability and the greatest incentives to undertake the follow-on 
innovations.  This assumption will be examined at greater length later.  Suffice it for now 
to say that a number of leading commentators of intellectual property have challenged 
this assumption.
150
  It would be a mistake for the antitrust courts to sacrifice possible 
follow-on innovation by rival innovators in the name of a theory of questionable validity. 
iii) General-Purpose Technology vs. Specialized Technology 
¶87  Related to the incremental vs. radical innovation distinction is the classification of 
general-purpose technology (“GPT”) and specialized or non-general-purpose 
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technology.
151
  Examples of GPT include electricity and computer.
152
  A recent addition 
of GPT is three-dimensional printing, which allows one to produce a three-dimensional 
object from scratch.  According to The Economist, it is likely to revolutionize the 
manufacturing industries by allowing just about anyone to create a complex object at 
home.  This emerging technology is expected to “reset the economics of manufacturing. 
Some believe it will decentralise the business completely, reversing the urbanisation that 
accompanies industrialisation.”153  Whether a technology is general-purpose or not is 
related to its breadth, in particular, its range of applications.  A GPT is a technology that 
has a wide range of possible applications.  A GPT is likely to be radical and redounds 
considerable benefits for society.  The above discussion concerning how the antitrust 
courts should take into account the radical nature of an innovation thus equally applies to 
GPT.  However, a radical innovation need not be general-purpose.  AZT, the first drug 
that was effective in retarding the replication of HIV, was no doubt a radical innovation.  
Its range of application, however, is rather limited.  
¶88  While much of the discussion about GPT in the academic literature has focused on 
its contribution to economic growth, the breadth of a technology may also have 
implications for the patent-antitrust interface.  Here, it is necessary to invoke the intuition 
behind Frank Ramsey’s theory on optimal commodity sales tax.154  Ramsey argues that 
the optimal way to achieve a certain sales tax revenue target is to levy it on many goods 
as opposed to concentrating the tax incidence on one good.  Here, the idea is that with 
respect to a GPT, society would be better off if innovation costs are recouped from a 
wide range of applications as opposed to a few of them.  The welfare loss would be 
considerably smaller.  Restricting the patentee reward of the innovator from one 
application would not undermine innovation incentives so long as the patentee could 
recover the shortfall from other applications.  And the aggregate social welfare loss 
would be smaller than if the patentee attempted to recover its innovation costs from one 
application alone.  Multiple-channel recoupment is only possible if the technology has a 
broad range of applications.  That would be the case for GPT.  Therefore, when facing an 
antitrust case involving a GPT, the courts should display greater readiness to trade 
patentee reward for gains in social welfare.  In fact, it would serve social good for the 
courts to steer the patentee to diversify its recovery channels by restricting its patent 
exploitation practices within each application. 
iv) Serendipitous Innovation vs. Routinized Innovation 
¶89  This distinction pertains to the source and the process of innovation.  It refers to the 
source of inspiration for innovation and how the process of innovation is managed.  Ideas 
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for serendipitous innovation come from unexpected and unpredictable sources.
155
  
Serendipitous inventions may happen accidentally or follow a flash of genius.  They do 
not come about simply because a firm devotes all the resources at its disposal to a 
technical challenge.  They may be produced by innovators of all shapes and sizes, from 
individuals to small firms to multinational corporations.  Meanwhile, routinized 
innovation is largely the province of large corporations.  The routinization of innovation 
is the standardization and regularization of the innovative process.
156
  It transforms 
innovation from “a fitful and uncertain discovery process into something closer to a 
routine internal matter governed by the bureaucratic and managerial procedures that also 
control many of the other activities of the large corporation.”157  Serendipitous innovation 
has been responsible for some of the most important inventions and discoveries,
158
 while 
routinized innovation focuses on incremental improvement in product quality, reliability, 
and user-friendliness.   
¶90  For our purpose, the most relevant characteristic of routinized innovation as 
opposed to serendipitous innovation is that the former is much less uncertain.  By 
regularizing innovation activities, and by performing R&D on a regular basis and in a 
sufficient amount, routinization “increases the likelihood that some successful 
innovations will emerge at reasonably regular intervals.”159  The relatively low 
uncertainty for this type of innovation means that the adjustment that needs to be made to 
private benefits to reflect the risk of innovation will be smaller.  Another conclusion of 
Baumol’s concerning routinized innovation also has important implications for the 
patent-antitrust interface.  He argues that in a contestable, oligopolistic market with low 
barriers to entry, firms will not make any more than normal profit plus depreciation 
contributions that will allow them to recover their R&D investment outlays.
160
  This 
would imply that for these firms, patentee reward is barely sufficient to cover innovation 
costs.  Assuming that other sources of private benefits are small, there will be little room 
for the courts to tinker with patentee reward without adversely affecting innovation 
incentives. 
2. Correspondence Between Technology and Product Boundaries 
¶91  The correspondence between technology and product boundaries focuses on the 
relationship between an innovation and its eventual commercial manifestation.  It refers 
to the fact that while some products, such as drugs, consist of one or a handful of 
technologies,
161
 other products, such as most consumer electronics, electrical appliances, 
complex machinery, automobile, etc. are made up of hundreds or even thousands of 
technologies.  To put it slightly differently, the technology and product boundaries for 
innovations such as drugs coincide, while the two boundaries for consumer electronics 
and machinery do not.  As Burk and Lemley noted, “[m]uch of the conventional wisdom 
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in the patent system is built on the unstated assumption of such a one-on-one 
correspondence.”162  The presumed direct correspondence between innovation and social 
welfare applies to discrete innovations such as pharmaceuticals.  For technologies that 
demonstrate considerable complementarity, such a direct relationship can no longer be 
presumed.  These technologies would only be socially beneficial if they could be utilized 
together with their complements.   
¶92  The most important implication of technological complementarity for the patent-
antitrust interface is that the ability of an innovation to create value for society crucially 
depends on the availability of other complementary technologies.  Should the owner of 
one of the technologies decides to withhold its own contribution, many other 
technologies will be rendered useless and society will stand to lose tremendous value.  
This was vividly illustrated in the Blackberry saga when NTP, Inc., the owner of one of 
the patented technologies in Blackberry, threatened to shut down the whole Blackberry 
service.
163
  It was eventually able to extract more than $600 million of damages from 
RIM, the developer of Blackberry.
164
  This saga was also a painful reminder of the 
possibility of holdup for complementary technologies.  When dealing with these 
technologies, the antitrust courts must be mindful of the enormous loss of social benefits 
that may result if one patentee is allowed to hijack the entire product by opportunistic 
behavior. 
3. Cumulative Innovation 
¶93  Cumulative innovation concerns the relationship between the initial innovation and 
future technological development, or more specifically, the follow-on innovation that 
may be developed based on the initial innovation.  Cumulative innovation would not be 
an issue at all if the initial innovation were a dead-end technology that could not be 
further improved upon.  In reality, however, very few technologies belong to this 
category.  Paper clips, which were at one point patented, come to mind, although even 
they have been improved upon by encasement of the metal with plastic.
165
  Most 
technologies, meanwhile, carry considerable potential for substantial improvement.  
Bicycles, which when first invented in the nineteenth century were fairly simple 
machines, have been substantially enhanced in the ensuing years through the deployment 
of new materials such as carbon fiber and advancement in mechanics.
166
  The importance 
of cumulative innovation for technological progress has been affirmed by numerous 
scholars.
167
  Industries for which cumulative innovation is particularly important include 
biotechnology, computer software, and computer hardware, some of the pivotal industries 
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to the modern-day economy.
168
  Scholars have also noted that overly expansive patent 
protection retards cumulative innovation.
169
  The challenge for the patent-antitrust 
interface is to facilitate the development of subsequent improvements while ensuring that 
the initial innovators are adequately compensated for their innovation costs.   
¶94  Before delving into this policy challenge, the first question we need to answer is 
whether the initial innovators or the rival innovators are best positioned to come up with 
new improvements.  The policy challenge would be much less severe if the initial 
innovators were in most cases better equipped to improve the initial technology, or at 
least to locate innovators who are able to do so.  The challenge would become 
considerably more complex if the sources of improvement were often unexpected and 
unpredictable, defying coordination by the initial innovator.  From a social perspective, 
the policy challenge is two-fold: first, society would want to secure the improvements so 
long as they redound net social benefits, and second, society would want to minimize the 
costs of creating these improvements.  Specifically, society would want to avoid 
duplicative R&D by competing innovators pursuing the improvement.  The detriment of 
duplicative R&D is exacerbated by the lack of an independent invention defense under 
patent law.  Once an improver has secured a patent for an improvement, its rivals will be 
barred from practicing that improvement even if they had independently created it.   
¶95  Views on this dual policy challenge have largely fallen into two camps.  Edmund 
Kitch, the leading proponent of the prospect theory, believes that the initial innovator is 
best positioned either to come up with further improvements or to identify innovators 
able to do so.  To Kitch, the main purpose of the patent system is not to provide 
incentives for innovation, but to encourage further commercialization of existing ideas 
and the exploration of improvements by granting prospective property rights over these 
as yet undiscovered ideas.
170
  The initial innovator is hence tasked with coordinating 
commercialization of the existing innovation and the search for further improvements, 
with a view toward avoiding duplicative investments.  If this view was correct, antitrust 
law should refrain from interfering with patent exploitation, at least as pertaining to 
cumulative innovation, since whatever licensing decisions taken by the patentee can be 
presumed efficient.  Patentees would be presumed to know best how to commercialize 
and pursue further improvements.  The prospect theory would hence leave a very limited 
role for antitrust to police patent exploitation practices, at least in relation to licensing.   
¶96  Unsurprisingly, subsequent commentators have challenged Kitch’s rosy view of the 
efficiency, if not omniscience and good faith, of the initial innovator.  Critique of the 
theory has come from a variety of angles.  First, it has been questioned whether the 
innovator is truly better positioned to pursue improvements than his rivals.  Even if the 
innovator and its rivals were equally capable of producing improvements, the odds still 
hugely favor the rivals due to their numerical advantage.
171
  For the incumbent innovator 
to out-innovate all its rivals, its technical edge over them would have to be enormous.  
Second, from a practical perspective, it has been argued that even if the initial innovator 
possessed perfect information to identify the most appropriate improver, the initial 
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innovator would still incur considerable transaction costs in order to reach an agreement 
with the improver.
172
  Negotiating a licensing agreement can be enormously time-
consuming and costly for the innovator.  And transaction costs are not confined to the 
innovator’s identification and negotiation with potential improvers.  It is entirely possible 
for an improver to come up with a significant improvement to the initial innovation not 
knowing that the innovation is patented.  The improver will then need to identify the 
patentee and negotiate with it.  This task will be even more arduous if the improvement 
implicates more than one patent, as is often the case.   
¶97  Transaction costs are compounded by the problem of uncertainty.  Negotiating an 
agreement in light of the considerable uncertainty in technological improvement will 
necessitate higher transaction costs.  The uncertainty would be reduced, if not eliminated 
altogether, if the innovator and the improver begin negotiations after the improvement 
has been made.  There would be no more uncertainty about the success of the 
development of the improvement.  However, ex post negotiations expose the improver to 
potential holdup by the innovator, especially if the improvement falls squarely within the 
scope of the initial patent.  Commentators have noted that efficient negotiations over 
technological development must take place ex ante to avoid strategic behavior on the part 
of the initial innovator, which will result in under-compensation of the improver and a 
socially sub-optimal level of improvement.
173
   
¶98  The more fundamental critique of the prospect theory is the unrealistic assumption 
of perfect information on the part of the innovator.  Many commentators have argued that 
new ideas are likely to spring up from various, often unexpected, sources.  It is almost 
impossible for a central planner lacking perfect information to identify all the 
possibilities.  Under the evolutionary model of innovation, innovation is “best understood 
as a quasi-Darwinian process—a process almost of trial and error in which the market 
selects from among diverse approaches whose relative promise cannot be assessed in 
advance.  This approach implies that a multiplicity of sources of inventive activity is 
superior to a centralized process directed by the patentee.”174  If one subscribes to this 
view of innovation, it seems obvious that the prospect theory will lead to a sub-optimal 
level of improvement.  Merges and Nelson have argued that it is to be expected that “a 
single rightholder . . . underdevelop—or even ignore totally—many of the potential 
improvements encompassed by their broad property right.”175   
¶99  The obvious response to the evolutionary model is that theoretically speaking, there 
is no difference between having ten firms vying for innovation in an industry as opposed 
to unifying all these ten firms into one and having them operate as separate research 
divisions.  Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe that the two scenarios are not 
equivalent and that inter-firm diversity would be more conducive to innovation than 
intra-firm diversity.
176
  Managerial diseconomies impose a limit on how large a firm can 
grow before its management can no longer keep abreast of its internal operations and 
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further internalization of outside productive activities becomes inefficient.  A firm that 
encompasses the innovative capacity of an entire industry is likely to have gone beyond 
that point.   
¶100  The prospect theory presumes rational behavior on the part of the innovator.  
Lemley has questioned this presumption, arguing that the initial innovator may 
irrationally eschew licensing for non-economic reasons.
177
  It may be due to a bitterly 
fierce rivalry between two competing firms.  It may be due to distrust of a rival’s good 
faith to abide by the licensing agreement.  It may be due to fear, rational or irrational, that 
the licensed technology will somehow assist rivals in ways that are unforeseen by the 
innovator.  For example, the Wright brothers steadfastly refused to license their patents 
on aircraft technology to anyone, and actively brought litigation against other aircraft 
developers.
178
  In fact, it took a war (the First World War) and intervention by the 
Secretary of the Navy to break this gridlock and bring all the related patents together so 
that their complementary technical potential could be fully exploited.  Meanwhile, there 
was no government intervention to overcome the personal animosity between Guglielmo 
Marconi, the patent holder for the diode technology—a crucial component of the early 
radio—in the U.S., and Lee de Forest, the inventor of the triode, which was a significant 
improvement over the diode.
179
  Their failure to settle their differences withheld from the 
world the benefits of this significant improvement for years.
180
  These anecdotes lend 
support to Lemley’s assertion that proponents of the prospect theory have a misplaced 
faith in the knowledge, rationality, and good faith of the innovator to serve the social 
good.
181
   
¶101  All these arguments lead to the inevitable rejection of the prospect theory.  In a 
way, the debate between the proponents and the opponents of the prospect theory is 
reminiscent of the long-run conflict between patent and antitrust.  It may be recalled that 
while the fundamental belief of antitrust is that competition generates more innovation 
over the long run, patent law seems to hold the contrary Schumpeterian view.  It was 
argued then that the abiding faith of antitrust in competition means it prefers rivalry over 
exclusivity in innovation.  Here, we are facing the same dilemma.  The aforementioned 
theoretical arguments notwithstanding, whether the initial innovator or potential 
improvers are best positioned to generate improvements is ultimately an empirical 
question, the answer to which will perhaps remain elusive for quite some time.  In the 
end, absent overwhelming evidence and arguments negating the merits of competition, 
antitrust should favor competition over exclusivity.  And the evidence and arguments in 
support of the prospect theory are far from overwhelming.  Finally, Kitch himself admits 
that prospect rights may create substantial market power and may result in supra-
competitive pricing.
182
  While he identified the problem, he offered no solution for it.
183
  
Given the focus of antitrust on consumer welfare, this probable consumer harm further 
militates against the prospect theory.   
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¶102  A rejection of the prospect theory means that competition among potential 
improvers takes on added importance.  Follow-on innovators must have sufficient 
technological access to allow them to develop their improvements.  At the same time, it 
remains important to preserve the incentives of the initial innovator.  The dual policy 
challenge highlighted earlier presents an inevitable internal conflict.  The question is how 
should the balance be struck between these conflicting considerations.  This question is 
particularly important for the patent-antitrust interface because of the considerable social 
benefits of cumulative innovation.   
¶103  While antitrust needs to take an active role in securing the benefits of cumulative 
innovation, especially in situations where patent law does not provide the appropriate 
solution, it remains to be seen how it should be done.  Economists distinguish three 
scenarios of cumulative innovation: first, where an initial innovation spawns numerous 
follow-on innovations; second, where many initial innovations, mostly in the form of 
research tools, are needed to create a single second-generation innovation; and third, 
where the subsequent innovation represents an improvement of the initial one and yet the 
two compete with each other.
184
  The second and the third scenarios have been called, 
respectively, the “anticommons” and the “quality ladder” models of cumulative 
innovation.
185
  This author will call the first scenario the “trunk-branch” model for lack of 
a better name in the literature.  The three scenarios present disparate challenges for the 
patent-antitrust interface.  
¶104  Of all three models, the quality ladder model probably presents the least pressing 
need for antitrust intervention.  If the improvement is a radical one, it may benefit from 
the doctrine of reverse equivalents and escape infringement.  To the extent that an 
innovation issue can be resolved internally within patent law, that solution is to be 
preferred.  Even if that doctrine or other patent internal solutions are unavailable, antitrust 
still must proceed cautiously.  There are a number of reasons for this.  First, in most 
quality ladder scenarios, subsequent improvements directly compete with the initial 
innovation. This competition will allow the improver to erode the innovator’s profit, 
which may be essential to the innovator’s recoupment of its innovation costs.  In fact, the 
erosion of profit might be so severe that future innovators will lose their incentives to 
innovate.  Second, it would seem that the denial of the improvement would not deprive 
society of a product altogether; it would only leave us with a less advanced version of it.  
This scenario is different from the other two scenarios where denied access to the 
innovator’s technology may preclude the creation of subsequent products altogether.  
Given that the first-generation technologies in those two models are often basic science 
research or research tools such as gene fragments, from which society derives no direct 
benefit, the development of second-generation products is doubly important to society.  
Moreover, as previously pointed out, the welfare effects of a product innovation are 
ambiguous.  By choosing to interfere to facilitate the improver’s access to the innovator’s 
technology under the quality ladder scenario, it is conceivable that antitrust may be 
responsible for lowering the private benefits of innovation without producing any net 
social benefits.  
 
184
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¶105  Under the trunk-branch model, the beneficial social effects of the widespread 
utilization of the “trunk” technology are significant.  So long as the initial innovator is 
compensated for its innovation costs, antitrust should facilitate technology diffusion.  
This is particularly so because the technology has a myriad of applications.  However, 
given that many of the trunk technologies belong to basic scientific research, which have 
no independent commercial value, licensing to second-generation users would be the 
primary means of recouping the innovator’s costs.  Here, the Ramsey intuition is again 
relevant.  From a social welfare perspective, society would be better off if the innovator 
distributed its cost recovery among a wide range of uses, while minimizing the 
distortionary effect within each use.  The patent-antitrust rules should reflect this by 
limiting the scope of patent exploitation, so that the innovator can be steered to diversify 
its recovery channels.   
¶106  The term “anticommons” was originally coined by Professors Michael Heller and 
Rebecca Eisenberg in 1998 as a play on the term “commons.”186  Anticommons present a 
particularly tricky situation because of the significant possibility of holdup by any one of 
the owners of the research tools.  Private parties often resolve the situation themselves 
through patent pools or packaged licensing.  This is another version of the 
complementarity problem that was mentioned previously.  There it involved a number of 
components going into a final product and here a number of complementary research 
tools needed for further research and production of second-generation products.  It was 
argued then that antitrust has a robust role to play to minimize instances of holdup.  The 
same conclusion applies here. 
4. Appropriability Conditions in the Industry 
¶107  Appropriability refers to the conditions of an industry that allow the innovator to 
reap the economic benefits of its innovation.  It “summarizes the possibilities of 
protecting innovations from imitation and of reaping profits from innovative 
activities.”187  As discussed in Section Error! Reference source not found., there is a 
whole range of appropriation mechanisms at the innovator’s disposal to allow it to profit 
from its innovation.  To the extent that an innovator relies on other appropriation 
mechanisms, patentee reward will become relatively less important.  In fact, Mansfield 
and Levin conclude that in many industries, patent protection was not even necessary to 
attract innovation.
188
   
¶108  Economists have discovered that firms in different industries rely on patent 
protection for innovation incentives to varying extents.  Levin and his co-authors 
classified the one hundred manufacturing industries surveyed in their study into three 
clusters.
189
  The first cluster, consisting of food products and metal products among 
others, does not seem to rely on any particular appropriation mechanism except for sales 
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Vol. 11:5] Thomas Cheng 
 429 
and marketing.
190
  The second cluster depends on a wider range of appropriation 
mechanisms, such as first-mover advantages, learning curve advantages, and secrecy.  
The third cluster, which includes pharmaceuticals and chemicals, is the only group that 
utilizes patent protection extensively.  These results are consistent with Mansfield’s 
findings, which show that patent protection plays a much more important role in 
appropriating returns in the pharmaceuticals and chemicals industries than in electronics 
and machinery.
191
   
¶109  These findings can be used as a basis for the courts to determine how much 
patentee reward can be traded off for net social benefits in a particular industry.  This is 
especially useful if quantitative determination of the weight of patentee reward relative to 
overall private benefits of innovation cannot be made.  For example, when faced with a 
patent-exploitation practice arising in a first-cluster industry, the courts can be less 
concerned about preserving innovation incentives and pay closer attention to welfare loss.  
The relative lack of reliance on patent protection will give the courts more room for 
restricting the scope of patent exploitation under antitrust law without undermining 
innovation. 
5. Summing Up 
¶110  The foregoing discussion is not meant to provide exhaustive guidance for every 
type of patent-antitrust case.  What the practical guidelines in this Section are meant to do 
is to highlight the most relevant issues for the antitrust courts to consider in a patent-
antitrust case.  The central message is that while the courts should remain mindful of 
maintaining innovation incentives, achievement of that goal does not require complete 
deference to patent rights.  Given that innovation incentives are preserved whenever 
innovation costs are covered, and that patentee reward is but one of the myriad 
appropriation mechanisms available to innovators, there is in fact significant leeway for 
the courts to protect and advance social welfare without undermining innovation 
incentives.  So long as innovative incentives are unaffected, the antitrust courts should 
aim to maximize net social benefits, which can be accomplished by enhancing social 
benefits or reducing social costs, or both.  The focal points are the facilitation of 
cumulative innovation and the minimization of consumer welfare loss.
192
   
¶111  Consumer welfare has always been a central concern of antitrust.  However, when 
facing a patent-antitrust case, the antitrust courts often seem too ready to defer to patent 
policy for fear of undermining innovation incentives.  One of the main goals of this 
Article is to clarify our understanding of innovation incentives and to reveal the 
excessively pro-patent bias of the conventional wisdom.  Two leading commentators 
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have noted that “[l]egal scholars have failed to appreciate that unconstrained monopoly 
pricing is not a cost-justified means of rewarding patentees.”193  In light of this improved 
understanding of innovation incentives, it would seem that reluctance to tinker with 
patentee reward can no longer be justified in the name of preserving innovation.   
¶112  The importance of cumulative innovation has not been as widely recognized within 
the antitrust circle as it has by patent law scholars.  Given its importance in generating 
economic growth, antitrust should pay closer attention to it.  Antitrust professes to take 
dynamic efficiency considerations seriously, but thus far it seems to have done so only 
with a certain subset of those considerations, namely the provision of incentives for the 
initial innovation.  Other dynamic efficiency considerations have been largely 
overlooked.  This is a grave mistake.  Rectifying this mistake will require the antitrust 
courts to make some difficult judgments.  However, there is no reason to believe that it is 
beyond the capability of these courts.   
¶113  A further message of the foregoing discussion is the need for the courts to 
distinguish between different types of innovation in different industries.  As has been 
repeatedly pointed out by patent commentators in recent years, not all innovations are the 
same.  There is a high degree of heterogeneity among innovations that the antitrust courts 
need to consider.  These distinctions include the nature, breadth, depth, and source of 
innovation; its relationship with the final product; and its relationship with other 
technologies.  Lemley advocated an industry-specific approach to the patent-antitrust 
interface.
194
  This Article asks the courts to go one step further and focus on the various 
attributes of the technology at issue.  These attributes will help the courts predict the 
effects of its decision on the various parameters in the constrained maximization exercise.   
¶114  Lastly, it is important to clarify that this Article does not advocate drastic 
restrictions of patent rights.  While some of the theoretical discussions in Section Error! 
Reference source not found. suggest that patentee reward can be dramatically reduced 
without undermining innovation incentives (assuming that private benefits of innovation 
under the current patent system significantly exceed innovation costs for most 
innovations), which may lead the reader to surmise that this author advocates aggressive 
curtailment of patent rights by antitrust, the extent of intervention proposed in this Article 
is much more modest.  Substantial improvement of net social benefits can be achieved 
with minor restrictions of patent rights.  As Ayres and Klemperer observe, “[t]he last bit 
of monopoly pricing produces large amounts of deadweight loss for a relatively small 
amount of patentee profit.”195  Thus, small restrictions of patent rights and monopoly 
pricing will not significantly undermine innovation incentives.   
¶115  The theoretical discussion in Section Error! Reference source not found. 
admittedly lends support to more substantial modifications of patentee reward.  From a 
social efficiency perspective, such modifications may be desirable.  That, however, 
would be a usurpation of the fundamental tradeoff between static and dynamic 
efficiencies struck by Congress in designing the current patent system.  As crudely as that 
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Vol. 11:5] Thomas Cheng 
 431 
tradeoff was struck, any major changes to it should be made by Congress, and not the 
courts.  Calls for reform of the patent system and rollback of the increasingly expansive 
patent rights abound.
196
  There is ample evidence that the patent system as it currently 
operates is broken.
197
  Yet, these defects of the patent system do not justify massive 
interference on the part of antitrust law.  Patent law’s problems remain its own to solve.  
Drastic alterations to patent rights should not be made by the antitrust courts. 
IV. AN APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH: UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO LICENSE 
¶116  To demonstrate the application of the proposed approach, this Section will focus on 
how it applies to the analysis of a unilateral refusal to license a patent.
198
  Unilateral 
refusal to license a patent is one of the most controversial areas of the patent-antitrust 
interface.  To those staunch defenders of intellectual property rights, imposing a duty to 
license on a monopolist patentee constitutes a direct affront to private property.  In some 
ways, compulsory licensing has become a taboo in the U.S. antitrust circle.
199
  Mention of 
compulsory licensing seems to be greeted with skepticism, if not derision.   
¶117  The most common defense against imposing a duty to license is that it will 
undermine innovation incentives.  The conventional wisdom is that if an innovator is 
forced to share its creation with competitors, it will be less likely to invest in innovations 
in the future.  Other innovators will be similarly deterred.  By refusing to order 
compulsory licensing, the courts will effectively force rivals to develop their own 
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technologies, which leaves society better off.  Therefore, compulsory licensing 
undermines the innovation incentives of the patentee, the putative licensees, and potential 
future inventors.  This innovation incentive argument presumes that any reduction in 
patentee reward will reduce innovation incentives, and that the putative licensees possess 
the technological capacity and commercial interest to innovate.   
¶118  As has been repeatedly asserted in this Article, the former presumption is not true.  
So long as the innovator is compensated for its innovation costs, including the 
opportunity cost of innovation, innovation incentives will be preserved.  Prominent 
commentators and empirical evidence have affirmed this view.  Hovenkamp has 
advocated a nuanced and balanced stance on compulsory licensing:   
One corollary of the principle that an IP right is simply property is that no special 
deference is due to the IP laws when courts fashion remedies for proven antitrust 
violations.  For example, ordering compulsory licensing for a proven antitrust 
violation is no different than fining a firm or ordering divestiture of a plant.  
While we do not want to deter innovation, we do want to deter antitrust 
violations either.
200
  
In fact, it seems that patent lawyers and economists are less apprehensive about 
compulsory licensing than antitrust lawyers themselves.
201
  Levin and his co-authors 
concluded that compulsory licensing does not undermine innovation incentives in any 
significant manner.
202
  Scherer found that “the substantial amount of evidence now 
available suggests that compulsory patent licensing, judiciously confined to cases in 
which patent-based monopoly power has been abused . . . would have little or no adverse 
impact on the rate of technological progress . . . .”203  He further referred to specific 
conversations with executives of Xerox, which had been subject to compulsory licensing 
order in the 1970s, that refuted the popular belief that compulsory licensing had adversely 
affected the firm’s R&D.204  Scherer goes so far as to conclude that “a massive antitrust 
attack on business firms’ use of patents to monopolize markets or enhance profit returns 
appears to have had negligible adverse consequences for the vigor of innovative activity 
in the United States.”205   
¶119  While this Article in no way advocates a massive attack on patent rights, this author 
believes that imposing a duty to deal in limited instances will enhance social welfare.  
Preservation of innovation incentives cannot be treated as a trump card in every refusal to 
license case.  It must be scrutinized with care to verify that those incentives will truly be 
undermined if compulsory licensing is ordered.  In particular, the applicability of the 
innovation incentive argument depends on market conditions.  There are at least two 
circumstances under which the argument is unlikely to be valid: (1) aftermarkets; and, (2) 
patent holdup.   
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A. Aftermarkets 
¶120  As suggested earlier, the conventional argument against a duty to license presumes 
that reduced patentee reward will undermine innovation incentives and that the spurned 
rivals would have developed their own technologies.  The extent to which the latter is 
true depends on a variety of factors.  Of particular interest to us is the consideration about 
the level on which the rivals compete with the innovator.  If the rivals do not compete in 
the primary technology market and only compete in the aftermarkets in the provision of 
derivative products or services, denying them access to the technology will be unlikely to 
encourage innovation in the primary market.  They will simply exit the aftermarkets 
altogether.  This is aptly illustrated by the Federal Circuit CSU v. Xerox case,
206
 and the 
Ninth Circuit Image Technical Services v. Kodak case,
207
 which contains practically 
identical facts as CSU.  In those two cases, the request to deal was not made by Kodak’s 
and Xerox’s rivals in the primary photocopying machine market, but by independent 
service organizations (“ISOs”) that provide repair services for photocopying machines.  It 
is difficult to see how a rejection of a duty to deal would have spurred these ISOs to 
develop their own photocopying machine technology to compete with Kodak and Xerox.  
Compulsory licensing need not undermine the innovation incentives of the putative 
licensees.   
¶121  The patentee will no doubt focus on the first presumption and argue that profits 
generated from the aftermarkets are necessary for it to recoup R&D investment.  Unlike 
the case for the second presumption about rivals’ innovation incentives, it does not seem 
possible to come up with a categorical rule that will help the courts to distinguish valid 
and invalid claims about the first presumption.  The courts must instead scrutinize such 
claims closely and not accept them at face value.  The patentee should be required to 
produce concrete evidence to substantiate the claim, including evidence that shows that 
profits from the primary market is insufficient to cover the R&D costs.   
¶122  For instance, this claim about aftermarket profits would have been unlikely to hold 
in Image Technical Services, where Kodak had initially welcomed ISOs to provide 
maintenance and repair services.  It was only after the maintenance and repair market had 
become lucrative and Kodak had lost an important maintenance contract with the state of 
California that Kodak altered its prior policy of supplying parts to ISOs.
208
  If Kodak had 
considered profits from the aftermarket essential to its recoupment of R&D investment 
from the start, it would have been unlikely to have adopted an open policy with the ISOs 
initially.  The Ninth Circuit eventually dismissed Kodak’s business justifications for the 
refusal to deal on the ground that they were pre-textual, focusing on the subjective state 
of mind of Kodak’s employees.209  This approach has been criticized as being 
inconsistent with the modern antitrust focus on objective effects rather than subjective 
intent.
210
  By focusing on Kodak’s employees’ subjective state of mind, the Ninth Circuit 
was in fact attempting to verify Kodak’s innovation incentives argument.  This focus is 
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clearly correct.  The Ninth Circuit’s mistake was its reliance on the wrong type of 
evidence.  To determine the veracity of the innovation incentive argument, the Ninth 
Circuit should not have relied on what Kodak’s employees thought, but whether profits 
from the aftermarket were objectively necessary for Kodak to recoup its investment. 
B. Patent Holdup 
¶123  Patent holdup presents another situation in which imposing a duty to license may 
be appropriate.  Patent holdups are detrimental because they are likely to retard 
cumulative innovation.  They are also likely to provide a windfall to the patentee that is 
above and beyond the profit necessary for the recoupment of innovation costs.  The 
previous two Sections explain the importance of cumulative innovation as a major source 
of social benefits. Among the three models of cumulative innovation, patent holdup may 
be a particularly serious problem in the trunk-branch and the anticommons models.
211
  As 
discussed earlier, both situations present great potential for social welfare loss due to 
patent holdups.  Moreover, in the trunk-branch model, the Ramsey intuition means that 
antitrust can restrict patent exploitation at the margin without causing much effect on 
patentee reward.  Cumulative innovation hence can be unlocked without substantial loss 
of patentee rewards.  Patent holdup is likely to provide a windfall to patentees.
212
  In the 
event of a holdup, the negotiation usually takes place ex post after the innovation has 
already been made and the R&D costs are sunk.  The follow-on innovator is in a very 
weak bargaining position to secure a surplus from the negotiation that will allow it to 
recover those costs.  It may need to accept any licensing arrangement that allows it to 
cover its variable costs.  In fact, Lemley and Shapiro argue that ex ante negotiation would 
not significantly improve the follow-on innovator’s bargaining position.213  Cumulative 
innovation will be deterred over the long haul.   
¶124  Imposing a duty to license on opportunistic patentees may solve this problem.  If 
these patentees know that the courts may step in and mandate licensing at a reasonable 
royalty rate,
214
 they will be induced to enter into negotiations with follow-on innovators 
in good faith.
215
  The threat of compulsory licensing may become a default background 
legal rule against which negotiations between initial and follow-on innovators take place.  
The instances in which the courts need to intervene could be few.   
 
211
 The use of compulsory licensing to resolve holdup problems in anticommons situations has been 
endorsed by Burk and Lemley.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 29, at 1667.  And the use of compulsory 
licensing in the trunk-branch scenario is vividly illustrated in the Hybritech monoclonal antibodies case.  
SCOTCHMER, supra note 12, at 154.  The pioneering research on monoclonal antibodies was performed by 
scientists George Koehler and Cesar Millstein on public funding.  Hybritech, the patentee seeking to enjoin 
others from utilizing the technology, only developed diagnostic kits.  The innovation costs were likely to be 
insubstantial compared to the initial research, while the harm to social welfare would be great due to the 
importance of the technology.   
212
 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008 
(2007). 
213
 Id. at 2003–04.  
214
 The royalty of course needs to allow the initial innovator to recover its innovation costs. 
215
 The need for antitrust intervention in patent holdup cases has arguably receded after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), in which the Court 
unanimously overturned the longstanding presumption in patent law that a patentee is entitled to a 
permanent injunction following a finding of infringement.  This case has arguably reduced the possibility 
of holdup behavior.   
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C. Caveats 
¶125  A number of caveats about the use of compulsory licensing are in order.  First, 
compulsory licensing should be rarely granted when the patentee itself practices the 
patent.  In such a case, there is a greater likelihood of reciprocity of interests, which 
should encourage the parties to negotiate in good faith.  There is thus a lower likelihood 
of patent holdups.  When one party to the negotiation has no need for the counterparty’s 
technology, as in the case of patent trolls, opportunistic behavior and holdup are more 
likely.  Also, the fact that the patentee practices and commercializes the patent itself 
means that it is more likely to compete with the putative compulsory licensee.  As will be 
elaborated below, compulsory licensing should be rarely granted when the patentee and 
the licensee are competitors in the technology market.  Antitrust should encourage 
competition at the technology development level so that society can benefit from 
competing technological offers.   
¶126  Second, the courts should be cautious about imposing compulsory licensing when 
the putative licensee competes directly with the patentee in the primary technology 
market.  In relation to this point, it is worthwhile to evaluate Professor Daniel Crane’s 
objection to imposing a duty to deal with respect to intellectual property.  Crane 
distinguishes the denial of injunctive relief under patent law from antitrust imposition of 
a duty to deal, rejecting the latter while endorsing the former.  The crux of his objection 
is that the latter requires the monopolist patentee positively to assist rivals in the 
acquisition and deployment of the technology.
216
  This objection raises some fundamental 
questions about the relationship between compulsory licensing and innovation incentives.  
¶127  This author agrees with Crane that a patentee should not be required to provide 
positive assistance to its rivals if doing so will impair innovation incentives, both on the 
part of the patentee and the putative licensees (the incentive effect on future potential 
inventors presumably is a derivative of the effect on the patentee).  The purpose of 
antitrust law is to encourage competition in technology and innovation.  Having multiple 
firms pursue alternative routes to technological development is likely to be beneficial to 
society in the long run.  However, requiring a patentee to provide positive assistance 
would only reduce innovation incentives if the putative licensee competes with the 
patentee in the technology market; i.e., they offer competing technologies or products in 
the primary market.  It will have negligible impact on overall innovation incentives in the 
case of aftermarket competitors.
217
  ISOs and other aftermarket operators are ill-equipped 
to contribute technological alternatives in the primary market.  In fact, in most cases, the 
aftermarket operators do not license the technology in order to produce a competing 
product.  They obtain a license so that they can sell or use products manufactured by the 
patentee.  There is no concern about positive assistance to rivals that will undermine their 
innovation incentives.   
¶128  The same argument applies to follow-on innovators in the trunk-branch case as 
well as the anticommons case.  To the extent that these follow-on innovators do not 
compete with the initial innovator in the development of basic scientific research or 
 
216
 Crane, supra note 1, at 97.  
217
 In the case where the putative licensee competes with the patentee in both the primary technology 
market and the aftermarket, the overriding need to preserve innovation incentives in the primary market 
means that compulsory licensing should be disfavored.   
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research tools, compulsory licensing does not undermine innovation incentives on the 
part of these follow-on innovators.  The incentives of the initial innovator of course still 
need to be considered, but those will be preserved so long as private benefits of 
innovation cover innovation costs.   
¶129  Third, a unilateral refusal to license claim should only be upheld if imposing a duty 
to license would substantially improve competition or promote innovation.  Compulsory 
licensing may bring two main benefits: (1) greater competition in a market where 
competition has been hitherto precluded by patent protection, and (2) facilitation of 
innovation that builds upon the patented technology.  If neither benefit will materialize as 
a result of compulsory licensing, there would be few good reasons to alter the patentee’s 
reward, regardless of its impact on innovation incentives.  If the market at issue is already 
highly competitive, consumers will have little to gain from the competition introduced by 
compulsory licensing.  While some rivals may prefer to gain access to the patented 
technology to increase their competitive advantage, compulsory licensing in such a case 
would only result in wealth transfer between competitors with little attendant gains in 
consumer welfare.  This is clearly an insufficient justification for antitrust intervention.  
Similarly, if innovation will not be promoted by compulsory licensing, such as by 
overcoming patent holdup, compulsory licensing should not be imposed.   
D. Case Law 
¶130  The proposed framework to unilateral refusal to license cases is largely consistent 
with the outcome, if not the analytical approach, of the existing case law.
218
  Two leading 
cases, the Ninth Circuit Image Technical Services v. Kodak case and the In re 
Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation case, both involved ISOs of 
photocopying machines that did not produce photocopying machines or engage in 
research in photocopying technology.  The ISOs did not compete with the photocopying 
machine manufacturers in the primary market.  The two courts reached divergent 
outcomes with essentially the same facts.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the ISOs’ unilateral 
refusal to license claim, while the Federal Circuit did not.  It is suggested that despite its 
misplaced focus on the subjective intent of Kodak’s employees, the Ninth Circuit’s result 
is more consistent with an approach to the patent-antitrust interface that strikes a balance 
between preserving competition and safeguarding innovation incentives.  With its 
expansive holding that absent a fraudulently obtained patent, sham enforcement action or 
illegal tying, a patentee is free to refuse to license its intellectual property, the Federal 
Circuit displayed too much deference to the patentee.  Apart from these enumerated 
circumstances, there are situations in which compulsory licensing may be imposed to 
preserve or promote competition and innovation without impairing innovation incentives.  
There was no evidence in that case that Xerox relied on the profits from the maintenance 
market to recoup its R&D costs.  Therefore, giving the ISOs access to Xerox’s parts was 
unlikely to have reduced the manufacturer’s innovation incentives.  Meanwhile, there 
was evidence in both cases that requiring Kodak and Xerox to deal with rivals would 
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 See, e.g., Image Technical Serv. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Indep. 
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed Cir. 2000), Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support 
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981); Intergraph 
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed Cir. 1999).   
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have substantially improved competition in the maintenance market: Kodak held at least 
80% of the maintenance market.  And there was evidence that the unavailability of spare 
parts had made it increasingly difficult for the ISOs to compete with Xerox.  There was 
also evidence in Kodak that many consumers actually preferred services provided by the 
ISOs.  Gains in consumer welfare in both cases from compulsory licensing would have 
been substantial.  With little impact on the patentee’s innovation incentives and 
substantial gains in consumer welfare, compulsory licensing should have been imposed in 
both cases.   
¶131  In SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., the Second Circuit refused to require Xerox to 
license its patent on plain paper copier to a competitor to allow the latter to compete with 
Xerox in the copier market.
219
  The court’s language was very much in favor of patentees 
and has been interpreted as creating a per se legality rule for unilateral refusal to license a 
patent.
220
  While a per se legality approach (if the Second Circuit did in fact intend the 
case to be interpreted as such) would clearly be too permissive, this author believes that 
the court reached the correct outcome in that case.  The reason is simply that the plaintiff 
was a direct competitor of Xerox’s in the photocopying machine market.  Imposing 
compulsory licensing would have directly affected Xerox’s patentee reward.  It would 
have also reduced SCM’s incentive to engage in its own research, which it presumably 
would have been prepared to do as it had planned to compete in the photocopying 
machine market.   
¶132  Another leading unilateral refusal to license case is Data General Corp. v. 
Grumman Systems Support Corp.,
221
 where the First Circuit rejected Grumman’s claim 
that Data General illegally maintained its monopoly in the market for servicing Data 
General’s computers by refusing to license its diagnostic software.  Similar to the ISOs in 
Image Technical Services and In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust 
Litigation, Grumman provided repair services for Data General’s computers.  This may 
suggest that the First Circuit should have upheld the unilateral refusal to license claim 
and ordered Data General to license its diagnostic software.  The crucial difference 
between this case and the two photocopying machine cases is that in those cases, the 
spare parts were simply part of the photocopying machines that did not require 
independent effort to invent.  The diagnostic software in Data General was itself a 
separate invention that required investments on the part of the computer maker.  
Therefore, at issue are two inventions, the computer and the diagnostic software.  
Allowing Grumman to gain access to the software may not have had much impact on the 
R&D for the computer, but it would most probably have undermined Data General’s 
research effort in the software.  Therefore, the First Circuit’s decision was consistent with 
the framework proposed in this Section.   
¶133  Lastly, in Intergraph v. Intel, the Federal Circuit rejected a unilateral refusal to deal 
claim by Intergraph, the owner of a technology known as “Clipper,” which Intel 
incorporated into its microprocessor chips.  Intel and Intergraph did not compete with 
each other in any relevant market.  Intergraph competed in the market for graphics 
workstations, which according to the court was already highly competitive.  Intel had 
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 36 F.3d at 1147.  
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been providing Intergraph technical assistance and privileged access to proprietary 
information, pre-release products, and allocation of new products.  Intergraph’s claim 
arose when Intel terminated their technical assistance and access to information services 
following repeated failure to settle a patent infringement suit between the two parties.  
While the technical assistance and access to information no doubt gave Intergraph an 
important commercial advantage in the graphics workstation market, there was no 
evidence that Intergraph needed the information and assistance for its own R&D.  The 
resulting benefit in innovation from compulsory licensing would have been minimal.  
Nor would consumers stand to gain much from it; the market in which Intergraph 
competed was already highly competitive.  The Federal Circuit thus reached the correct 
decision by rejecting Intergraph’s claim.   
¶134  The proposed approach to unilateral refusal to license is also consistent with the 
admonitions by Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Trinko,
222
 about the harm of 
judicial imposition of a duty to deal.  One of the gravest concerns expressed by Justice 
Scalia about imposing a duty to deal was that it would discourage firms from making 
future investments in physical facilities.
223
  The proposed approach specifically takes that 
concern into account by requiring that the innovator be fully compensated for its 
innovation costs.  The incentive to invest would not be impaired, as feared by Justice 
Scalia.   
¶135  Furthermore, Justice Scalia believes that “[e]nforced sharing also requires antitrust 
courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of 
dealing[.]”224  That concern may have been valid in the context of Trinko, which involved 
a heavily regulated industry where the identification of the parameters of sharing is more 
akin to the kind of rate-setting activities that are usually undertaken by the regulatory 
agencies.  It has little relevance for the unilateral refusal to license cases.  The federal 
courts regularly engage in royalty setting in patent damages determination.  The kind of 
“rate-setting” activity required in compulsory licensing is not unfamiliar to the courts and 
should not raise any special concerns.  Moreover, at least in the case of patent holdup, 
once the threat of compulsory licensing becomes a real one, judicial intervention will 
only be necessary if negotiation breaks down, which should be rare once judicial 
imposition of a duty to deal becomes a distinct possibility.   
¶136  Justice Scalia further argues that enforced sharing encourages collusion.225  While 
that is no doubt a valid concern, policing against collusion is the bread-and-butter of 
antitrust agencies.  There is no reason to believe that the agencies will be uniquely 
incapable of detecting collusion among technology firms.  Joint ventures may facilitate 
collusion, and that has not prevented the agencies from approving them in most instances.  
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The likelihood that collusion may materialize in compulsory licensing situations is 
arguably lower than that within joint ventures, given the involuntary nature of the former. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶137  This Article calls for the restoration of a full and more probing consideration of 
innovation incentives in the patent-antitrust interface.  A full consideration should not 
solely focus on the incentives of the original innovator, but those of the follow-on 
innovators as well.  This is important because cumulative innovation creates substantial 
social benefits.  The technological development process does not end after the initial 
innovation.  Subsequent innovations will build on it and create more value for consumers 
and society.  A probing consideration should not accept any innovation-based defenses of 
patent exploitation practices at face value, as some antitrust courts seem to have done.  
Instead, it should ask searching questions about the extent to which a patentee depends on 
patentee reward for innovation incentives.  There should be a return to full recognition 
and application of the fundamental premise of the patent system that innovators will 
continue to produce innovations as long as their innovation costs are fully compensated.  
While most courts are fully aware of this premise, they seem to overlook it as soon as 
they turn their attention to a concrete case and become singularly focused on preservation 
of patentee reward.  Once this premise is again fully recognized, the courts will realize 
that there is considerable room to advance consumer welfare without impairing 
innovation incentives.  Antitrust need not show the same degree of deference to patent 
policy as has often been advocated.   
¶138  This, however, does not mean that antitrust should interfere with the patent system 
on a substantial scale.  To the extent that the specific policy issues presented by the 
patent-antitrust interface are already resolved internally within the patent system, antitrust 
should wisely abstain from intervention.  There are signs that the patent system is moving 
in the right direction and beginning to curtail expansive patent rights.  But where antitrust 
can play a useful role, the courts should not shy away from it simply because dynamic 
efficiency arguments are by their nature more difficult to evaluate and rebut.  It is the job 
of the antitrust courts to subject every pro-competitive justification presented to them to 
close scrutiny.  No argument should be allowed to become a trump card; not even one 
based on something as important to economic growth as innovation.  The antitrust courts 
have underestimated their ability to assess dynamic efficiency arguments.  Once the 
courts recognize the diversity of innovations and acquire a fuller understanding of the 
various attributes of innovation, the courts will be in a better position to assess these 
arguments.  This Article has only illustrated the application of this new awareness in the 
context of the unilateral refusal to license a patent.  The implication of the proposed 
approach in other areas of the patent-antitrust interface remains to be explored.  The hope 
is that, in time, a more balanced approach to the patent-antitrust interface with full and 
fair consideration of dynamic efficiency arguments will emerge.   
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